1 2	Nick Heimlich (SBN 233232) Law Offices of Nicholas D. Heimlich 900 Lafayette Street, Suite 509		
3	Santa Clara, CA 95050 Tel: (408) 457-9364 Fax: (408) 257-9904 Eml: nick@nickheimlichlaw.com		
5	Attorneys for Plaintiff NO SLIPPY HAIR CLIPPY, INC.		
6	UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT	
7	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SACRAMENTO DIVISION		
8	NO SLIPPY HAIR CLIPPY, INC.,	Case No. 2:10-CV-01478-JAM-JFM Judge: John A. Mendez	
10	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO	
11	VS.	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER VENUE	
12	ALMAR SALES CO., INC., AND DOES 1-100, INCLUSIVE;	DATE: November 17, 2010 Time: 9:30 a.m.	
13 14	Defendants.	Courtroom: Courtroom 6, 14 th Floor Judge: The Hon. John A. Mendez	
15	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR		
16	TRANSFER VENUE		
17		SUMMARY :	
18	Plaintiff has properly pled that venue is based upon 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) and (c). First		
19	Amended Complaint ¶ 12. First, Defendant does not contest that venue is proper under 28		
20	U.S.C. 1391(c), so Defendant's motion b	pased on improper venue should be denied. Second, as	
21	to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) venue is proper in t	the Eastern District because Defendant's passing off	
22	(sales to customers) occurred here in the	Eastern District of California as shown by Plaintiff	
23	seeing the product 3 months before the s	uit and purchasing the product down the street from	
24	Plaintiff. Ramey Salyer Decl. ¶ 3-5, Ex	. A, B, Nick Heimlich Declaration ¶ 5, Ex. H. All the	

key events to this suit occurred within 30 miles of this Courthouse. <u>Id</u> . Plaintiff is located within
30 miles. Defendant's product was sold within 30 miles of this courthouse and within 1 mile
from Plaintiff. Everything happened in this forum and the case should stay here. Defendant
cites the wrong standard for venue in trademark cases, as the proper venue is where the passing
off occurred (sales to consumers), <u>not</u> where the shipments originated. <u>Allstar Marketing Group</u>
v. Your Store Online, LLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1128 (C.D. Cal., 2009). Third, as to a transfer
based on convenience, Plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference because
Plaintiff is located in the forum and the passing off (sales of infringing product) occurred here.
Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno Hartzell Propeller, Inc v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
Defendant cannot demonstrate that the factors clearly favor a transfer because the factors are
neutral or in favor of keeping the lawsuit in the Eastern District of California because Plaintiff is
located here and key non-party witnesses regarding sales of Defendant's infringing product are
located at BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California in the District.
Ramey Salyer Decl. ¶ 3-5, Ex. A, B, Nick Heimlich Declaration ¶ 5, Ex. H. Venue is proper in
the Eastern District based on the passing off occurring here, Plaintiff's location and Defendant's
purposeful availment of California's customers and Defendant's motion should be denied.
I. Factual Background

Principal Register, for "Princess Bow" for hair accessories, namely Barrettes, Class 26.

Plaintiff owns U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 3,218,564, issued March 13, 2007 on the

(First Amended Complaint "FAC" ¶ 15, Ex. C, Ramey Salyer "Salyer" Decl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff has used its mark since December 10, 2003. FAC ¶ 16, Salyer Decl. ¶ 16. Defendant sells products under confusingly similar names, namely, "Princess" and "Princess Expressions" "Princess Academy". FAC ¶ 18. Defendant does not show that

Defendant sold even a single clip under the "Princess Bow" mark. Further, Defendant's allegations that Plaintiff didn't use its Princess Bow mark until 2004 or that it abandoned the mark are totally without merit. Plaintiff shows use of the mark with invoices for each and every year from 2003 through 2010. Salyer Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. D.

Plaintiff has alleged venue under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), (c). FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff pleads under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) that the Eastern District of California is where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. The facts involving these theories are that Defendant sells products which are confusingly similar in Plaintiff's forum. FAC ¶ 9-11, Salver Decl. ¶ 3-5, Ex. A, B. Plaintiff visited two local stores near Plaintiff's headquarters in Vacaville, California (in the Eastern District of California) which carried and sold Defendant's products. Plaintiff's declaration of Ramey Salyer shows that there is even a large Almar made display at a store in Vacaville, California focused on Defendant's Princess Expressions trademark. Salver Decl. ¶ 3-5, Ex. A, B, Heimlich ¶ 5, Ex. H. Defendant has a website directed toward California consumers with California provisions in its "Privacy Policy" and "Terms of Use", which is soliciting business in California. Nick Heimlich Decl. ¶ 2, 3, Ex.s E, F. Defendant also has a sales representative for its "Princess Academy" products located in California, which is clearly directing sales efforts at California. Nick Heimlich Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. G. Finally, Defendant's products are even being recalled for lead in California. Nick Heimlich Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. K. Defendants claim that it has de minimus sales in California is simply not true based upon the information on its own website, products sold in California stores, and a sales representative located in California who represents exclusively California. Almar's counsel admits that they sell to BigLots! in a letter (Heimlich Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. I), but yet Almar states that they have no sales to BigLots! in California (Heimlich Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. J). Defendant's discovery responses to date that they have Zero sales in California to BigLots! and Food Fair are not to be

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believed because of the concrete evidence from Plaintiff showing the product in store and purchasing the product from the stores in California.

Plaintiff pleads that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction because of purposeful availment and direction to the forum and the claim is related to defendant's forum related activities. Here, Defendant has sold product and directed its actions and sales in California at BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California among others.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed suit on June 15, 2010 for trademark infringement of its Princess

Bow trademark, false designation of origin, unfair competition and cancellation of

Defendant's Princess Expressions and Princess Academy marks. Defendant then filed a

motion to dismiss or transfer venue on or about August 6, 2010. Plaintiff amended its

Complaint on August 27, 2010. Defendant filed this motion to dismiss or transfer venue

on September 20, 2010 amended on September 22, 2010.

III. Legal Arguments

- A. <u>Venue is Proper in the Eastern District of California because the passing off and Defendant's solicitation occurred here and Plaintiff is located here.</u>
 - 1. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c) which Defendant does not dispute.

Plaintiff, by his first amended complaint alleged venue was based on 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c).

FAC ¶ 12. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c) because Defendant is subject to personal

jurisdiction in this district. Defendants do not dispute this by their motion and therefore this is

waived and the Court may proceed to the transfer issue based on the interests of justice or

convenience. Personal jurisdiction is established by showing purposeful direction by Defendant,

a connection between Defendant's actions and the suit, and that the exercise of jurisdiction is

2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b) because of Defendant's sales of infringing product (passing off) in the Eastern District, a California sales representative, and solicitation directed at California consumers.

Venue is proper in trademark cases where the passing off (or sales to consumers) occurs, not where the product is shipped from as Defendant contends. "("The place where the alleged passing off occurred ... provides an obvious correct venue"), and Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1956) ("[T]n cases involving trademark infringement and unfair competition, the wrong takes place not where the deceptive labels are affixed to the goods or where the goods are wrapped in the misleading packages, but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff's")); see Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Madrona Vineyards, L.P., No. C 05-0587 MHP, 2005 WL 701599, *4 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 23, 2005)." Allstar Marketing Group v. Your Store Online, LLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1128 (C.D. Cal., 2009) (underline added). Here, we have sales in the Eastern District of California as demonstrated by Plaintiff's declaration and the

Defendant's other cited cases are distinguishable, and Plaintiff will address those in turn. Defendant cites Spiegelberg v. Collegiate Licensing Co., 402 F.Supp.2d 786, 792 (S.D. Tex 2005) for the proposition that it is the alleged infringer's principal place of business that is often the controlling consideration in transfer of venue motions. However, that case is distinguishable because the only person related to that case that was in the court's district was Plaintiff's counsel. Id. at 790. There were no parties or witnesses in the district and the retail business selling the product was not in the district either. Id. at 791. By contrast, Plaintiff is located in this district (Plaintiff's counsel is not), and the retail sales of Defendant's product is in the Eastern District of California at BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California. Thus, this cited case does not support Defendant's motion.

Defendant cites <u>Cartier v. D & D Jewelry Imports</u>, 510 F.Supp.2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) for the proposition that where there is an Internet based business, and the website was operated from California and the product shipped only from California, then California is where the alleged infringing activities occurred. However, what Defendant left out from that case is that the store owner's only retail store was in California and that the only reason that the case was brought into New York was because the Plaintiff specifically ordered and requested shipment of product from California to New York. <u>Id.</u> at 345. Here, Plaintiff did not specifically order that product be shipped into California, the product was already in California stores based on Defendant's actions at retail stores in California including BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California. This cited case does not help Defendant because of the differences between that case and the case at bar.

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B. The Court should deny a discretionary transfer because all factors to evaluate a transfer favor the Eastern District of California or are neutral.

1. There is a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's choice of forum when the Plaintiff resides in the chosen forum and Defendant seeks to transfer under 28 USC § 1404(a).

The United States Supreme Court stated that there is a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's choice of forum when the Plaintiff resides in the forum. Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno Hartzell Propeller, Inc v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981), Langford v. Ameritanz, Inc. 2006 WL 1328223 *8 (E.D.Cal.). The Southern District of New York also stated, "The burden is on the moving party, here defendants, to make a "clear and convincing showing" that transfer is proper." Cartier v. D & D Jewelry Imports, 510 F.Supp.2d 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y., 2007). The Eastern District of California has further stated that the Plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed and that the moving party (here, Defendant) bears a heavy burden of showing the inconveniences to it. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.P.A., 899 F.Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. Cal., 1994). Given the burden, Defendant must make a convincing case for venue and because Defendant cannot meet that burden Defendant's motion to transfer should be denied.

2. The interests of justice and convenience regarding a transfer under 28 USC § 1404(a) favor Plaintiff and keeping the case in the Eastern District of California because of non-party witnesses located in the forum.

Plaintiff will now address the factors for a discretionary transfer under <u>Jones v.</u> <u>GNC Franchising, Inc.</u>, 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000).

Factors to evaluate discretionary transfer:

Factors 1) And 5) The factor regarding the location of relevant agreements/contracts is not applicable here.

This factor is not applicable because there are no agreements between the parties.

Factor 2) The factor regarding the state that is most familiar with governing law is not applicable here.

The relevant law is trademark law (unfair competition, as Defendant notes is a similar legal standard) which is federal law and the Eastern District of California and the Southern District of New York are equally able to apply such law. This factor is neutral as to transfer.

Factor 3) The factor regarding Plaintiff's choice of forum is relevant and weighs strongly in Plaintiff's favor.

In this case, Plaintiff is located in the Eastern District of California and as such there is a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's forum. Further, Defendant has a sales representative located in California and assigned exclusively to California, has sales in California in the Eastern District as shown based on Plaintiff's purchase of Defendant's product down the street from Plaintiff and solicits California customers from its websites. This factor therefore weighs strongly in Plaintiff's favor.

Factor 4) The factor regarding the respective parties' contacts with the forum favors the Eastern District of California as the forum for this dispute.

In this case, clearly Plaintiff is based in the Eastern District, which makes that forum appropriate for Plaintiff. As to Defendant, Plaintiff has produced evidence that Defendant has a sales representative located in California and assigned exclusively to California, Almar has sales in California in the Eastern District based on Plaintiff's purchase of Almar's product down the street from Plaintiff and Almar also solicits California customers from its website. Defendant states that it conducts NO business in California and sold NO product to Food Fair in Vacaville,

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CA and BigLots!. Defendant has produced no evidence of where its sales are in terms of quantity or location despite Plaintiff's attempts at focused interrogatories to address this issue. Based on the evidence, Defendant's statements claiming NO sales in California are simply not believable because the statements are contradicted by actual photographic and receipt evidence produced by Plaintiff. Defendant's statements simply denying any business should be given little or no weight as they are contradicted by concrete evidence.

Factor 6) The factor regarding the differences in costs of litigation is neutral.

As between the Eastern District of California and the Southern District of New York, at least one of the parties will have to conduct litigation at a distance and as such the costs of litigation in two federal courts are likely to be similar or neutral in this case.

Factors 7) and 8) the factors regarding the compulsory process for non-party witnesses and ease to access to sources of proof weigh heavily in Plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff in its declarations has identified the locations where infringement has occurred and those non-party witnesses are located in the Eastern District of California because they work at BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California. Salver Decl. ¶ 3-5, Ex. A, B, Heimlich ¶ 5, Ex. H. As stated in Jones (at 499), it is the non-parties that the Court is concerned with when it comes to witnesses. Here, Plaintiff has identified a group of witnesses that are needed for this action, however, Defendant has only identified itself and its employees, whom are not given much weight in this factor. This factor weighs against transfer.

1) Defendant's cited cases regarding a convenience transfer are factually distinguishable.

As to both Adachi v.Carlyle/Galaxy San Pedro, L.P., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (S.D. Cal. 2009), and <u>In re TS Tech USA Corp.</u>, 551 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) these cases are both stated above. Second, as to the factors for transfer, they are in Plaintiff's favor because Plaintiff is located in the forum and because Plaintiff has identified non-party witnesses located in the forum at BigLots! and Food Fair in Vacaville, California. Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion because Defendant cannot show that Plaintiff's choice of forum is clearly and convincingly unfair to Defendant.

Plaintiff's request for Specific Findings, leave to amend or additional discovery

If the Court is inclined to grant the motion, Plaintiff requests the Court make specific factual and legal findings as to venue. Plaintiff also requests an opportunity to remedy those issues, if any, by additional amendments to its pleadings and/or discovery on those issues to more fully present factual evidence.

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1	Oral Argument:
2	If the Court is inclined to grant an oral argument to the Defendant, then Plaintiff also
3	requests an opportunity to be heard and expects that Plaintiff should be able to present its oral
4	argument in no more than 20-30 minutes.
5	Conclusion:
6	For all of the above reasons, Plaintiff requests that Defendant's motion to dismiss or
7	transfer venue be denied.
8	Dated: <u>11/03/2010</u>
9	Respectfully submitted,
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11	Nick Heimlich Attorney for Plaintiff
12	No Slippy Hair Clippy, Inc.
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