## IN THE UNITED STATES INSTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CORE 9.3

CASE NO:

JAMES KEHOE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

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FIDELITY FEDERAL BANK AND TRUST,

Defendant.

# CIV-HURLEY

MAGISTRATE JUDGË

#### **COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION**

Plaintiff, JAMES KEHOE, sues Defendant, FIDELITY FEDERAL BANK AND TRUST, and states:

1. This is a class action pursuant to the Driver Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721 *et seq.* (the "DPPA"). Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and behalf of all similarly situated individuals whose "personal information" is contained in any "motor vehicle record" maintained by the State of Florida, within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(1) and (3), who have not provided "express consent," within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(5) to the State of Florida for the distribution of their "personal information" for purposes not enumerated by the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2721(b), and whose "personal information" has been knowingly "obtain[ed]" and used by the Defendant within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2724.

2. Plaintiff is a resident of the Southern District of Florida and holder of a Florida driver's license, which constitutes a "motor vehicle operator's permit," referenced in the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(1). Plaintiff is also the owner of an automobile registered in Florida, for which there is a "motor vehicle title" and "motor vehicle registration," referenced in the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(1). Plaintiff's Florida driver's license, motor vehicle title and motor vehicle registration all contain "personal information" concerning Plaintiff, within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(3). These records disclose, among other things, Plaintiff's name, address and race.

3. This action arises under a federal statute and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724(a) (conferring jurisdiction on the United States District Courts for actions under the DPPA) and 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

4. Venue is appropriate in this District because Plaintiff is a resident of this District and Defendant conducts business within the Southern District of Florida.

5. The DPPA was included as part of omnibus crime legislation passed by Congress in 1993, known as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993. Senator Boxer, one of the DPPA's Senate sponsors, described several well-publicized incidents in which criminals had used publicly available motor vehicle records to identify and stalk their victims. Those incidents included:

- a. the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer in California by a man who had obtained Schaeffer's address from California's Department of Motor Vehicles;
- home invasion robberies by a gang of lowa teenagers who identified their victims by copying the license numbers of expensive automobiles and used those license numbers to obtain the addresses of the vehicle owners from the lowa Department of Transportation; and

c. the Arizona murder of a woman whose home address was identified from the Arizona Department of Motor Vehicles.

Senator Boxer also explained the ease with which a California stalker had obtained the addresses of young women by copying their license numbers and requesting their addresses from the California Department of Motor Vehicles.

6. As Senator Boxer explained, prior to the time of the passage of the DPPA, in "34 States, someone [could] walk into a State Motor Vehicle Department with your license plate number and a few dollars and walk out with your name and home address."

7. Representative Moran, who sponsored the DPPA in the House of Representatives, explained that "very few Americans realize that by registering their car or obtaining a driver's license through the DMV, they are surrendering their personal and private information to anyone who wants to obtain it. When informed that such information can be so easily obtained, most licensees are shocked and angry. According to a survey released by the National Association to Protect Individual Rights, 92 percent of Americans believe that the DMV should not sell or release personal data about them without their knowledge and approval."

8. As originally enacted in 1993, the DPPA made it unlawful for any person or organization to disclose or obtain personal information derived from any motor vehicle record, unless the subject of the information had authorized such disclosure or the request/disclosure qualified under a recognized exception, including use by any federal or state agency, use in connection with motor vehicle and driver safety, use in court proceedings, use in certain research activities, use relating to certain insurance matters, and use for verification of personal information submitted by the subject of such information. Use of personal information for marketing activities was permitted, so long as the States had provided individuals identified in motor vehicle records with the opportunity to prohibit such disclosures. This "opt out" provision effectively gave individuals the right to prohibit the States from disclosing personal information for marketing purposes. 18 U.S.C. §2721 (1993).

9. Congress significantly amended the DPPA in 1999 by eliminating the "opt out" provision for marketing activities. Use or obtaining of personal information contained in motor vehicle records for "surveys, marketing or solicitations" is now permitted only "if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains." Similarly, a requester of personal information may obtain such information for any purpose, "if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains." 18 U.S.C. §2721(b)(13), (14) (1999). By changing the "opt out" exceptions of the 1993 DPPA to "opt in" exceptions in the 1999 DPPA, Congress significantly reduced the categories of persons whose personal information may be lawfully obtained under the Act. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666, 669 (2000) (upholding the constitutionality of the DPPA) (States may no longer "imply consent from a driver's failure to take advantage of a stateafforded opportunity to block disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver's affirmative consent to disclose the driver's personal information" for restricted

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purposes.). The effective date of the 1999 amendments to the DPPA was June 1, 2000.

10. Florida law does not conform to the requirements of the 1999 amendments to the DPPA. Contrary to the DPPA's requirements that drivers "opt in" before the State can disclose their personal information for marketing or solicitation, Florida still permits disclosure of personal information unless drivers formally request that the State's Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") to refrain from doing so. Sec. 119.07(3)(aa)(12), Fla. Stat.

11. Under the DPPA, a "person" who knowingly obtains or discloses "personal information" concerning another from a "motor vehicle record . . . shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains." 18 U.S.C. §2724(b). The DPPA provides for liquidated damages in the amount of \$2,500.00 for each violation of the DPPA, in addition to punitive damages upon a showing of a willful or reckless disregard of the law, reasonable attorney's fees and costs and other relief, including preliminary and equitable relief. 18 U.S.C. §2724(b). A "person" under the DPPA is defined as "an individual, organization or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof." 18 U.S.C. §2721(2)

12. Defendant, Fidelity Federal Bank and Trust is a bank that offers personal and business deposits, lending, insurance and trust services within the Southern District of Florida.

After the effective date of the 1999 amendment to the DPPA (June 1, 2000), the Defendant unlawfully obtained "personal information" of individuals from the Florida "motor vehicle records" in violation of the DPPA.

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14. Upon information and belief, Defendant obtained numerous lists of motor vehicle titles containing "personal information" from Florida "motor vehicle records" in violation of the DPPA.

15. Defendant's violations of the DPPA have been committed "knowingly," within the meaning of the DPPA 18 U.S.C. §2724(b). In the context of the DPPA, to act knowingly is to act with knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. *See, e.g., Bryan v. United States*, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998) ("[U]nless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term `knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."). Defendant knows that it obtained personal information pertaining to individuals from Florida motor vehicle records.

16. The information obtained by the Defendant from "motor vehicle records" constitutes "personal information" within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(3). Defendant's obtaining and/or using such information is unauthorized by the DPPA and unlawful. Each record of personal information knowingly obtained from motor vehicle records is a separate and distinct violation of the DPPA, remediable under the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2724.

#### CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

17. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and Local Rule 23.1(2), Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself, and all others similarly situated, as representatives of the following class (the "Class"):

Each and every individual in the State of Florida whose name, address, driver identification number, race, date of birth, sex and/or social security number are contained in motor vehicle records obtained by the Defendant from the State of Florida's Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, without the express consent of such individuals, from June 1, 2000, through the date of judgment herein.

Excluded from the class are persons who have expressly authorized the State of Florida's DHSMV to provide third parties with their "personal information" for any purpose.

18. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are met in this case. The

Class, as defined, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

19. There are questions of fact and law common to the Class as defined,

which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members. The common questions include:

- a. whether Defendant obtained and/or improperly used "personal information" from the "motor vehicle records" of members of the Class, within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2725(3), (1);
- b. whether Defendant's obtaining and use of "personal information" from the "motor vehicle records" of members of the Class was done knowingly, within the meaning of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2724(a).
- 20. Plaintiff can and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the

interests of the Class as defined and has no interests that conflict with the

interests of the Class. This is so because:

- a. All of the questions of law and fact regarding the liability of the Defendant are common to the class and predominate over any individual issues that may exist, such that by prevailing on his own claims, Plaintiff will necessarily establish the liability of the Defendant to all class members;
- Without the representation provided by Plaintiff, it is unlikely that any class members would receive legal representation to obtain the remedies specified by the DPPA;

- c. A remedy available under the DPPA is the liquidated sum of \$2,500, which Plaintiff intends to seek for all members of the Class; and
- d. Plaintiff has retained competent attorneys who are experienced in the conduct of class actions. Plaintiffs and their counsel have the necessary resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiffs and their counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibility to the class members and are determined to diligently discharge those duties to obtain the best possible recovery for the Class.

21. All class members have the same legal rights under the DPPA. Defendant's violations of the DPPA have affected numerous Florida motor vehicle owners and lessees in a similar way. The class action is superior to any other method for remedying Defendant's violations of the DPPA given that common questions of fact and law predominate and the liquidated damage provisions of the DPPA make the remedy available to class members identical. Class treatment is likewise indicated to ensure optimal compensation for the Class and limiting the expense and judicial resources associated with thousands of potential claims.

22. Defendant's knowingly obtained "personal information," pertaining to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class from "motor vehicle records" maintained by the State of Florida DHSMV, in violation of the DPPA. 18 U.S.C. §2721 *et seq.* Defendant's obtaining and use of this "personal information" was not for a purpose authorized by the DPPA.

23. Pursuant to the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2724(a), Defendant is liable for knowingly obtaining "personal information" pertaining to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class from "motor vehicle records," in violation of the DPPA.

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24. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of \$2,500.00 for each instance in which the Defendant violated the DPPA.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment on his behalf and on behalf of the other members of the Class to the following effect:

- a. declaring that this action may be maintained as a class action;
- b. granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class against the Defendant in the amount of \$2,500.00 for each instance in which the Defendant obtained or used personal information concerning the Plaintiff and members of the Class;
- c. punitive damages should the Court find that the Defendant acted in willful or reckless disregard of the DPPA;
- d. attorney's fees and costs incurred; and
- e. requiring the Defendant to destroy any personal information illegally obtained from motor vehicle records.
- f. such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

### **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable.

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by law, except as provided	by local rules of court. 1	ntained herein neither rep This form, approved by the	lace nor supplement the fili	ng and service of pleadi United States in Septem	ngs or other papers as required ber 1974, is required for the use	
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	DEFENDANTS			
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	all others similarly situated,			-HURLEY		
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(d) CIRCLE COUNTY WHERE			BEACH, MARTIN, ST. LUCIE.	INDIAN RIVER, OKEECHO	HEE HIGHICANDS	
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VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION XX UNDER ER.C.P. 23		DEMAND \$	CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: XXXYES DNO			
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