

1 PETER D. KEISLER
 Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division
 2 CARL J. NICHOLS
 Deputy Assistant Attorney General
 3 DOUGLAS N. LETTER
 Terrorism Litigation Counsel
 4 JOSEPH H. HUNT
 Director, Federal Programs Branch
 5 ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
 Special Litigation Counsel
 6 tony.coppolino@usdoj.gov
 RENÉE S. ORLEANS
 7 renee.orleans@usdoj.gov
 ANDREW H. TANNENBAUM
 8 andrew.tannenbaum@usdoj.gov
 Trial Attorneys
 9 U.S. Department of Justice
 Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
 10 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
 Washington, D.C. 20001
 11 Phone: (202) 514-4782/(202) 514-4263/(202) 514-4504
 Fax: (202) 616-8460/(202) 616-8202/(202) 318-2461

12 Attorneys for the United States of America

13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 15

16 TASH HEPTING, GREGORY HICKS)
 17 CAROLYN JEWEL and ERIK KNUTZEN)
 on Behalf of Themselves and All Others)
 18 Similarly Situated,)
)
 19 Plaintiffs,)
)
 20)
)
 21 v.)
)
 22)
)
 23 AT&T CORP., AT&T INC. and)
 DOES 1-20, inclusive,)
)
 24 Defendants.)
)
 25)

Case No. C-06-0672-VRW

**UNITED STATES' REPLY IN
 SUPPORT OF THE ASSERTION
 OF THE MILITARY AND
 STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND
 MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE
 ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY
 JUDGMENT BY THE UNITED STATES**

Judge: The Hon. Vaughn R. Walker
 Hearing Date: June 23, 2006
 Time: 9:30 a.m.

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1 (U) The United States respectfully submits this Reply in support of the United States'
2 Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege and Motion to Dismiss or, in the
3 Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Motion to Dismiss”).¹

4
5 (U) INTRODUCTION

6 (U) There are several fundamental flaws with Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the United States’
7 Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege and Motion to Dismiss or, in the
8 Alternative, for Summary Judgment. We demonstrate those flaws, and respond to various
9 arguments in Plaintiffs’ brief, below. In doing so, the United States reiterates that, as its *in*
10 *camera, ex parte* filings demonstrate, this case must be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot
11 establish that they have standing and cannot prove the merits of their statutory or constitutional
12 claims because resolution of those legal issues depends entirely on facts that, in light of their
13 highly classified nature, cannot be made the subject of litigation. Indeed, the most basic factual
14 allegation necessary for Plaintiffs’ case—whether defendant AT&T has engaged in certain
15 conduct at the behest of the National Security Agency (“NSA”)—can neither be confirmed nor
16 denied by AT&T or the United States. As the *in camera, ex parte* submissions demonstrate, the
17 state secrets assertion precludes Plaintiffs from making out a prima facie case on any of their
18 claims; AT&T cannot present the facts that would constitute its defenses; and the “very subject
19 matter” of the case is a state secret. *See Kasza v. Browner*, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir.)
20 (“notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ ability to produce nonprivileged evidence” case should be
21 dismissed “solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege” where the ““very subject matter
22 of the action is a state secret””) (quoting *United State v. Reynolds*, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n. 26 (1953)),
23 *cert denied*, 525 U.S. 967 (1998).

24 (U) Plaintiffs do not contest that the United States, through the Director of National
25 Intelligence (“DNI”), has properly invoked the state secrets privilege. Nor do they seriously

26
27 ¹ (U) Plaintiffs have not opposed the United States’ Motion to Intervene, filed on May 13,
2006. *See* Docket No. 122.

1 contest that disclosure of the information over which the DNI has asserted the privilege would
2 cause harm to national security. Instead, Plaintiffs primary and off-repeated argument is that
3 they already have “established” violations of the statutory and Constitutional provisions on
4 which they base their claims. But that argument confuses assertions and allegations with
5 established facts. Plaintiffs merely assert various facts in their Complaint and through
6 declarations, and on key points they entirely rely on speculation and hearsay. As a result of the
7 state secrets privilege, the United States and AT&T cannot publicly respond to Plaintiffs’ claims
8 of fact, but this obviously does not mean that those claims are correct.

9 **[REDACTED TEXT]**

10 (U) Unable to seriously contest the effect of the United States’ assertion of the state
11 secrets privilege, Plaintiffs make a broadside attack on the privilege, arguing that it lacks any
12 constitutional basis and that Congress can, and has here, abrogated that privilege. Again,
13 Plaintiffs are wrong. The state secrets privilege embodies central aspects of the Executive’s
14 responsibilities under Article II of the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s
15 organ for foreign affairs. As demonstrated below, Congress plainly has not restricted the
16 Executive’s authority to protect foreign intelligence gathering through assertion of the state
17 secrets privilege—nothing in the text or history of the FISA (or any other related statute)
18 provides even the slightest indication that Congress meant to and did attempt to abrogate the
19 Executive’s well-recognized authority to invoke this privilege. And as further demonstrated
20 below, Section 1806(f) of the FISA, the primary statutory provision on which Plaintiffs rely, is
21 wholly inapplicable to this dispute.

1 (U) ARGUMENT

2 I. (U) **PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED AND CANNOT ESTABLISH THE**
3 **FACTS NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING OR TO PROVE THEIR**
4 **CLAIMS.**

5 A. (U) Plaintiffs' Claim That They Have Established a *Prima Facie* Case is Both
6 Irrelevant and Incorrect.

7 (U) Plaintiffs' entire opposition is premised on their claim that they already have
8 established, as a result of facts that are in the public domain, violations of the FISA and other
9 statutes, as well as the Fourth Amendment.² As a result, Plaintiffs contend, the Court can
10 proceed to consideration of their legal claims notwithstanding the United States' assertion of the
11 state secrets privilege. That contention misstates the law. While Plaintiffs have not remotely
12 established a *prima facie* case, dismissal or summary judgment would be required even if they
13 had.

14 (U) Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, "Ninth Circuit precedent" does not "require[]" that,
15 when the state secrets privilege is asserted and upheld, the case nonetheless "goes forward
16 based on evidence not covered by the privilege." Plts. Opp. at 10 (citing *Kasza*, 133 F.3d at
17 1166). *Kasza* described that outcome as only one of three possible "effects" of a valid privilege
18 assertion, depending on the circumstances of the case. *Kasza*, 133 F.3d at 1166. The Court of
19 Appeals went on to identify the two other potential effects of a valid assertion, and the
20 circumstances that trigger them: (1) where the privilege deprives the defendant of the use of
21 information necessary to its defense, "the court may grant summary judgment to the
22 defendant," *id.* (internal citation omitted); and (2) "*notwithstanding the plaintiffs' ability to*
23 *produce nonprivileged evidence*, if 'the very subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then
24 the court should dismiss the plaintiffs' action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets
25 privilege." *Id.* (quoting *Reynolds*, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26) (emphases added). As the United States

26 ² (U) *See generally* Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for
27 Summary Judgment by the United States of America Based on the State Secrets Privilege ("Plts.
28 Opp.").

1 has shown in its Motion to Dismiss, both of those circumstances are present here—and would
2 continue to be present even if a *prima facie* case had been established.

3 (U) Indeed, Plaintiffs’ own arguments confirm that showing. They persistently confuse
4 speculative allegations and untested assertions for established facts. Plaintiffs rely entirely on
5 declarations by Mark Klein and J. Scott Marcus that contain numerous opinions,³ and various
6 media reports, *see, e.g.*, Plts. Opp. at 37 (citing to *USA Today* article),⁴ which obviously do not
7 establish facts in a court of law.⁵ In normal litigation, AT&T and the United States would have
8 the full opportunity to respond to these assertions by contesting them and introducing actual
9 evidence.

10 (U) As a result of the assertion of the state secrets privilege, however, neither AT&T nor
11 the United States can either admit or rebut the most basic elements of the allegations made by
12 Klein and Marcus. For the reasons we gave in our Motion to Dismiss, AT&T cannot even
13 confirm or deny the key factual premise underlying Plaintiffs’ entire case—that AT&T has
14 provided any assistance whatsoever to NSA regarding foreign-intelligence surveillance. Indeed,
15 in the formulation of *Reynolds* and *Kasza*, that allegation is “the very subject matter of the
16

17 ³ (U) Plaintiffs imply that we do not contest the Marcus and Klein declarations. *See, e.g.*,
18 Plts. Opp. at 2. However, we were never asked to, and never did, review the declarations. We
19 only reviewed the three documents the declarations rely upon, and only for the purpose of
20 determining that they are not classified. Plaintiffs obviously seek to obscure what the
Government reviewed by conflating the three documents and the declarations as the “Klein
materials.” *See id.*

21 ⁴ (U) Plaintiffs appear to suggest, without any support, that we are required to deny media
22 reports or they will be deemed admitted. *See, e.g.*, Plts. Opp. at 9 (“The government has never
23 denied the existence of a broader program that intercepts or collects records regarding purely
domestic communications. Plaintiffs have alleged and provided evidence of such a broader
program, which has also been widely reported in the press.”).

24 ⁵ (U) The problems with Plaintiffs’ approach is well-illustrated by their use of one of
25 those media reports. Plaintiffs state in their brief that “Homeland Security Secretary Michael
26 Chertoff confirmed that the government has employed ‘data-mining,’” Plts. Opp. at 9, but the
27 article actually stated that “[w]hile *refusing to discuss* how the highly classified program works,
Chertoff *made it pretty clear* that it involves ‘data-mining.’” *Id.* (cited exhibit). No Court would
ever accept this type of statement in a newspaper article as establishing a fact.

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1 action.” That allegation, as well as many of Plaintiffs’ other various assertions, is a necessary
2 element of each of their causes of action, but none can be accepted as an established actual fact
3 given that AT&T and the United States simply cannot respond to them.

4 (U) Plaintiffs’ contention that their sealed submission somehow distinguishes this case
5 from state secrets cases in which the claims were dismissed is thus untenable. Indeed, the
6 plaintiffs in many of the cases Plaintiffs cite had submitted far more record evidence than
7 Plaintiffs have presented here, but dismissal was still required. For example, in *Halkin v. Helms*
8 (*Halkin I*), 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the plaintiffs challenged the legality of NSA programs
9 involving the interception and copying of all international telegrams leaving or entering the
10 United States between 1945 and 1975, and the use of “watchlists” (which specifically included
11 some of the plaintiffs) to specifically monitor and report on the communications of U.S. persons
12 intercepted either through the telegram program (code-named SHAMROCK) or other foreign
13 signals intelligence activities (code-named MINARET). *See id.* at 4. A great deal of
14 information about these programs had been publicly acknowledged during the course of
15 congressional hearings, including the number of U.S. persons monitored through watchlists
16 (about 1,200 from 1967 to 1973), the number of intelligence reports issued by the NSA with
17 regard to watchlisted individuals (about 1,900 from 1967 to 1973), the specific
18 telecommunications companies that assisted the NSA with these activities (RCA Global, ITT
19 World Communications, and Western Union International), and the number of telegrams per
20 month reviewed by NSA analysts (about 150,000 from 1969-1972).⁶ In light of this publicly
21 available information, the district court had ruled that the state secrets privilege could not protect
22 the fact of whether the plaintiffs had been monitored under these programs. But the D.C. Circuit
23 reversed on that precise point, upheld the privilege, and the relevant claims were ultimately

24
25 ⁶ (U) *See Halkin I*, 598 F.2d at 4, 10; Final Report of the Select Committee to Study
26 Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, 94th
27 Cong., 2d Sess., Book III at 765 (Apr. 23, 1976); Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study
28 Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 5 at
12 (Oct. 29, 1975) (testimony of Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency).

1 dismissed for the inability to prove standing. *See id.* at 5, 9-10; *Halkin v. Helms (Halkin II)*, 690
2 F.2d 977, 999-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The same result is required here, where far less detailed
3 information about the alleged NSA activities has been officially confirmed or denied.

4 (U) Finally, a review of the *in camera*, *ex parte* submissions of the United States
5 demonstrate why Plaintiffs' assertion that they have presented a *prima facie* case cannot be
6 addressed, even if that assertion were legally relevant.

7 [REDACTED TEXT]

8 B. (U) Plaintiffs' Claim that They Can Establish Standing is Erroneous.

9 (U) Plaintiffs' assertion that they can establish the "injury in fact" needed to support
10 standing with the mere allegation that AT&T "increased the risk" that the NSA could intercept
11 their communications, *see* Plts. Opp. at 48-51, is flawed on multiple levels. Plaintiffs cannot
12 establish the factual predicate for their argument, and, even if they could, such a showing would
13 be insufficient to establish their standing.

14 (U) Plaintiffs' contention that AT&T "increased the risk" of NSA interception rests
15 entirely on their allegation that AT&T is cooperating to some extent with NSA's intelligence
16 collection activities. For the reasons noted above and in our Motion to Dismiss, however,
17 Plaintiffs cannot establish whether or not such cooperation exists because that factual question is
18 itself a state secret. Without that necessary link between AT&T and the NSA, Plaintiffs cannot
19 establish that there is any "risk" that they are suffering injury as a result of AT&T's actions.

20 (U) Moreover, Plaintiffs err in contending that *any* increase in the risk of interception
21 qualifies as an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III. The environmental cases upon
22 which Plaintiffs rely simply demonstrate that a litigant must establish a significant risk of harm
23 to his or her own interests to have standing to sue.⁷ Plaintiffs cannot make such a showing.

24 _____
25 ⁷ (U) In the environmental context, a plaintiff may establish an injury in fact "by showing
26 a connection to the area of concern" that is "sufficient to make credible the contention that . . .
27 [the plaintiff] has or will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or recreational satisfaction" "if
28 the area in question remains or becomes environmentally degraded" by the defendant's actions.
See Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

1 (U) First, Plaintiffs cannot establish any risk, let along a substantial risk, that their
2 communications will be intercepted by the NSA under the Terrorist Surveillance Program
3 (“TSP”) that has been publicly described by the President. The President has disclosed that the
4 TSP intercepts communications that originate or terminate outside the United States if the
5 communication involves members or agents of Al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations, *see*
6 Motion to Intervene at 2, but Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are, or have communicated
7 with, such persons. In fact, Plaintiffs expressly *exclude* from their putative class any persons
8 who knowingly prepare for or engage in international terrorism. *See* Am. Compl. ¶ 70; *see also*
9 Motion of Dismiss at 18 n.8. Plaintiffs have therefore pleaded that they are at *no* risk of having
10 their communications intercepted under the TSP.

11 (U) To the extent that Plaintiffs allege a risk of interception from surveillance broader
12 than that disclosed by the President, their allegations run headlong into the state secrets
13

14 That showing is necessary because a plaintiff must establish an individual-specific injury that is
15 derivative of the "injury to the environment" resulting from the challenged action. *See Friends*
16 *of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.*, 204 F.3d 149, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
17 banc). Because “[t]hreatened environmental injury is by nature probabilistic,” “[t]hreats or
18 increased risk” to a plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of the environment may constitute an injury in
19 fact. *See id.*

20 (U) Both *Pacific Lumber* and *Gaston Copper* illustrate the substantial showing needed to
21 establish standing. The *Pacific Lumber* plaintiffs established that actual runoff from the
22 challenged facilities flowed into a one-mile long stretch of creek that the plaintiffs used for
23 recreation. *See* 230 F.3d 1131, 1144-45, 1150. In *Gaston Copper*, the record was "replete with
24 evidence" showing hundreds of unlawful discharges of specific chemicals and their deleterious
25 effect on 16.5 miles of waterway that included an area owned and used by the individual whose
26 standing was at issue. *See* 204 F.2d at 152-53, 158-159. Both cases reflect that an
27 environmental plaintiff must establish standing by showing a “significant risk” to his or her own
28 interests from the past or imminent actions of a defendant. *See Central Delta Water Agency v.*
United States, 306 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying *Pacific Lumber* and *Gaston Copper*);
see also NRDC v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting contention that “an
increase in probability itself constitutes an 'actual or imminent' injury;” ruling that a plaintiff
must establish “a ‘substantial probability’ of harm” and “‘demonstrate a realistic danger of
sustaining a direct injury as a result’” of the challenged action). Thus, even if these
environmental cases would apply to this case, they do not advance Plaintiffs' cause.

1 privilege. In order to establish a risk that their communications will be intercepted by such
2 surveillance, Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the scope of any alleged surveillance and
3 prove that their communications would likely fall within its ambit. For all of the reasons
4 previously demonstrated, Plaintiffs cannot do so: all information concerning the existence,
5 scope, or functions of any such program is protected by the state secrets privilege and would
6 cause grave harm to the Nation's security if disclosed in this litigation.

7 C. (U) Information in the Public Domain Does Not Preclude the Assertion of the
8 State Secrets Privilege.

9 (U) Plaintiffs also are mistaken in their contention that the state secrets privilege does not
10 apply here because the information necessary to their suit is already in "the public domain."
11 Even when alleged facts have been the "subject of widespread media and public speculation"
12 based on "[u]nofficial leaks and public surmise," those alleged facts are not actually established
13 in the public domain. *See Afshar v. Department of State*, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir.
14 1983). To the contrary, even where such public speculation is widespread, forcing an "official
15 acknowledgment [or denial] by an authoritative source" that can "cause damage to the national
16 security." *Id.*; *see also, e.g., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Navy*, 891
17 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1989) (speculation of retired Admiral based on his considerable
18 military experience does not constitute official disclosure that would preclude Government from
19 withholding information); *Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd.*, 776 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th
20 Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal based on state secrets privilege where libel suit involved public
21 article purporting to disclose scientist's actions relating to military program because, while "fact
22 that this program exists is unclassified," its details were not and could not be addressed in suit
23 without doing harm to national security); *National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General*, 96 F.R.D.
24 390, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (explaining in state secrets context that official "disclosure of an
25 intelligence method or goal in a generalized way does not preclude protection of an intelligence
26 method or goal which relates to a particular time and place and a particular target"); *El-Masri v.*
27 *Tenet*, No. 1:05cv1417, 2006 WL 1391390, at *3-7 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2006) (explaining in the

1 state secrets context distinction between acknowledged existence of program and classified
2 details of program which must be protected).

3 (U) Plaintiffs' reliance on the district court's decision in *Spock v. United States*, 464 F.
4 Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), is unavailing. Plts. Opp. at 29. *Spock* involved a complaint whose
5 allegations concerned a surveillance program that had terminated years before the court's
6 decision. *See id.* at 513 n.4, 517. The Government specifically conceded that all of the
7 complaint's allegations about the defunct program had become "a matter of public knowledge,"
8 except for the allegation that the plaintiff's own communications had been intercepted. *Id.* at
9 519. Concluding that the state secrets privilege was "rooted in the constitutional separation of
10 powers" and "in the Article II powers of the executive," the court largely upheld the Executive's
11 invocation of the privilege based on its *in camera, ex parte* review of a governmental affidavit.
12 *Id.* at 518 & n.10. The court, however, accepted the plaintiff's assertion that the "one factual
13 admission or denial" concerning whether the plaintiff's own communications were intercepted
14 would "reveal no important state secret" and that the Government's concern about "disclos[ing]
15 additional information as the action progressed [was] somewhat premature" since the plaintiff
16 indicated he could move for summary judgment if that single allegation were admitted. *Id.* at
17 519, 520. The court thus declined to dismiss the case where the "only" disclosure at issue was
18 the bare admission or denial of a single allegation that, in the court's view and in the particular
19 circumstances of that case, would not have caused harm to the national security.⁸

20
21 ⁸ (U) To the extent that the district court's decision in *Spock* could be read to imply that
22 dismissal of a civil action is not a valid remedy to protect state secrets, such a notion has clearly
23 been rejected by later cases, including in the circuit where *Spock* was decided. *See Zuckerbraun*
24 *v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissal is "require[d]" in cases
25 where invocation of the state secrets privilege "precludes access to evidence necessary for the
26 plaintiff to state a prima facie claim," or "hampers the defendant in establishing a valid
27 defense"); *accord Kasza*, 133 F.3d at 1166.

28 (U) Likewise, the legal basis for the district court's conclusion that admitting or denying
whether the *Spock* plaintiff had been surveilled is not clear from its opinion. The court's *in*
camera, ex parte review of the government's affidavit may underlie its ruling that "no important
state secret" was involved with respect to this particular individual and a defunct, publicly

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1 (U) This case is very different from *Spock*, wholly aside from the question of whether
2 that case was correctly decided. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs challenge the operation of an entire,
3 ongoing program and allege that millions of communications are being intercepted, not merely a
4 single intercept from a defunct program. The *in camera*, *ex parte* submissions demonstrate why
5 confirming or denying whether or not Plaintiffs' communications have been the subject of
6 surveillance by the Government, and, if so, whether defendant AT&T had anything to do with
7 such surveillance, would reveal important state secrets and cause grave harm to the national
8 security.

9 (U) The other cases on which Plaintiffs rely are similar inapposite. *McGehee v. Casey*
10 stands for the obvious proposition the CIA's contractual agreement with its employees not to
11 publish classified information does "not extend to unclassified materials or to information
12 obtained [by the employee] from public sources." See 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 & n.9 (4th Cir.
13 1983).⁹ *Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole*, 463 U.S. 1303 (1983), is no better for Plaintiffs.
14 Writing as a Circuit Justice (and not for the Supreme Court as Plaintiffs' citation suggests),
15 Justice Brennan there granted an application to stay an order that permanently enjoined the press

16 _____
17 disclosed program. See 464 F. Supp. at 519. However, to the extent *Spock* might be read as
18 ruling that newspaper reporting of an alleged fact renders the state secret privilege inapplicable
19 to that fact, *id.* at 519, 520, *Spock* was wrongly decided. Such a rule would improperly place
20 national security decisions in the hands of reporters whose sources often speculate as to
21 government activity and whose reporting in any event will not always be presumed accurate or
22 reliable by the public, and would require the United States to officially confirm or deny such
23 reporting when the Government has not previously done so. That outcome would largely
24 eviscerate the state secret privilege and is contrary to more recent, authoritative decisions which
25 affirm the Government's right to protect national security information if the Government has not
26 officially disclosed the precise information to the public. See, e.g., *Afshar*, 702 F.2d at 1130-31;
27 *Hudson River*, 891 F.2d at 421-22; *Fitzgerald*, 776 F.2d at 1242-43.

28 ⁹ (U) Indeed, the Government's prepublication reviews of such articles, books, and other
materials "do not constitute official disclosures" because that review neither confirms nor denies
the accuracy of the text, see *Schlesinger v. CIA*, 591 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing
authority), and, for that reason, the factual assertions in such publications are not entitled to any
"presumption of reliability." See *Washington Post v. Department of Defense*, 766 F. Supp. 1,
11-12 (D.D.C. 1991).

1 from publishing the names of the jurors in a criminal trial even though the court had discharged
2 the jury when the trial completed. *Id.* at 1304. Because neither party sought the injunction
3 against disclosure, the names of the jury had been disclosed in open court, and the state had
4 “suggested no concern specific to th[e] case in support of [the] order,” Justice Brennan granted
5 the stay. *Id.* at 1305, 1307. As Justice Brennan observed, the Supreme Court has not “permitted
6 restrictions on the publication of information that would have been available to any member of
7 the public *who attended an open proceeding in a criminal trial.*” *See id.* at 1306 (emphasis
8 added). That principle is obviously irrelevant here.

9 D. (U) Plaintiffs Contradict their Position by Demanding Discovery into the
10 Underlying Facts.

11 (U) Plaintiffs directly contradict their argument that they are able to establish a prima
12 facie case on public facts by claiming that it will be necessary and appropriate for them to take
13 discovery as this case proceeds in the way they envision. *See, e.g.,* Plts. Opp. at 37 (indicating
14 Plaintiffs’ belief that they are “entitled to take discovery concerning the legality of the
15 surveillance at issue.”), 57-58. As demonstrated in our *in camera, ex parte* submissions, such
16 discovery would be wholly inappropriate. Numerous factual matters that bear on whether
17 Plaintiffs have standing, whether AT&T has actually provided data to NSA, and the nature of the
18 Government’s actions simply cannot be inquired into as a result of the state secrets privilege.

19 (U) Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that dismissal of their case is improper until they have
20 had the opportunity to take discovery. This claim is belied by other state secret cases. For
21 example, in *Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 935 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 1991), the
22 Second Circuit expressly rejected a claim that discovery should proceed despite the court’s
23 conclusion that assertion of the state secrets privilege precluded the litigation from continuing.
24 And, the courts of appeals have in various cases affirmed dismissal in light of the state secrets
25 privilege without any discussion of whether discovery has taken place or could continue. *See,*
26 *e.g., Black v. United States*, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, 517 U.S. 1154 (1996);
27 *Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992); *Fitzgerald*, 776 F.2d at

1 1236.

2 (U) Moreover, Plaintiffs' contentions that the state secrets privilege applies only "in the
3 context of specific discovery disputes," and that an assertion of the privilege may not be made or
4 adjudicated before an "individualized discovery dispute has ripened," Pls. Mem. at 52, is wrong
5 for an additional reason as well. If AT&T's Motion to Dismiss were denied, AT&T would be
6 obligated to file an Answer to the Complaint in which it would be expected to admit or deny
7 Plaintiffs' allegations. But because the very subject matter of this action involves privileged
8 state secrets, AT&T is foreclosed from admitting or denying most of those allegations. That
9 foreclosure would require dismissal of the case even if Plaintiffs had pledged to seek no
10 discovery at all.

11 E. (U) The United States' Public Filings Relating to the Assertion of the State
12 Secrets Privilege Are Sufficient.

13 (U) Plaintiffs also continue to claim that the United States did not provide a sufficient
14 explanation for its assertion of the state secrets privilege on the public record. *See* Plts. Opp. at
15 55. Obviously, however, because Plaintiffs do not know the details of the classified material,
16 they cannot know how much or how little can be revealed through a public record. As we
17 previously explained, requiring any more detailed showing here would be improper because it
18 would "force 'disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.'" *Ellsberg v.*
19 *Mitchell*, 709 F.2d 51, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting *Reynolds*, 345 U.S. at 8; *see also* 709 F.2d at
20 63 (noting the court's "[f]ear" that "an insufficient public justification resulting in denial of the
21 privilege entirely might induce the government's representatives to reveal some material that, in
22 the interest of national security, ought not to be uncovered"; further noting the "considerable
23 variety in the situations in which a state secrets privilege may be fairly asserted"); *see* United
24 States' Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Points and Authorities in Response to Court's
25 May 17, 2006 Order, at 17-20 (Docket No. 145).

1 **II. (U) THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE APPLIES HERE, AND CONGRESS**
2 **HAS IN NO WAY ATTEMPTED TO ABROGATE THAT PRIVILEGE.**

3 (U) Unable to show that their case can proceed in light of the United States' assertion of
4 the state secrets assertion, Plaintiffs mount a broadside attack on the privilege itself. Advancing
5 arguments that no court has credited— for example, that the privilege has no constitutional basis,
6 and that Congress overrode the privilege in enacting FISA— Plaintiffs contend that the privilege
7 is wholly inapplicable here. These arguments betray a basic misunderstanding of the state
8 secrets privilege and a fundamental misreading of FISA.

9 A. (U) The State Secrets Privilege Reflects the President's Constitutional Authority
10 over National Security and Foreign Affairs, and Thus is Constitutionally Based.

11 (U) The Supreme Court has made clear that the “authority to protect [national security]
12 information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief”
13 of the Nation's Armed Forces. *See Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
14 Indeed, the Court has specifically emphasized that the Executive's authority to “control access to
15 information bearing on national security” “exists quite apart from any explicit congressional
16 grant” of power because it flows primarily from the “constitutional investment of power in the
17 President” found in Article II of the Constitution. *Id.*; *see also* U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1 (“The
18 executive power shall be vested in [the] President”); *id.* § 2 (“The President shall be Commander
19 in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”); *cf. In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717, 742
20 & n.26 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002) (“tak[ing] for granted” that President has inherent
21 constitutional authority to collect electronic surveillance without warrant to obtain foreign
22 intelligence information, and noting that all “courts to have decided the issue” had agreed);
23 *United States v. Truong*, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) (rooting that authority in separation
24 of powers and the Executive Branch's primacy in foreign affairs; citing cases).

25 (U) The authority to invoke the state secrets privilege to protect national security
26 information from disclosure in judicial proceedings is merely one aspect of the Executive's
27 broader Article II power to control the dissemination of such highly sensitive information. *See*

1 *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). The *Nixon* decision repeatedly contrasts the
2 general constitutional privilege for Presidential communications “inextricably rooted in the
3 separation of powers” with the Executive’s more focused constitutional privilege “to protect
4 military, diplomatic, or national security secrets” in concluding that the general Executive
5 privilege does not enjoy the same legal standing as the state secrets privilege. *See id.* at 706,
6 708, 710-11 (explaining that the Supreme Court had never “extended th[e] high degree of
7 deference” applicable to the state secrets privilege “to a President’s generalized interest in
8 confidentiality” of his communications). In fact, it is precisely because the privilege for
9 “military or diplomatic secrets” is grounded in “areas of Art. II duties,” which the Executive
10 alone can exercise, that “courts have traditionally shown the upmost deference” to the
11 Executive’s discharge of these “Presidential responsibilities” regarding state secrets. *See id.*
12 (discussing *United States v. Reynolds*, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), as illustrative example).¹⁰

13 (U) The constitutional foundation for the state secrets privilege is reflected in its place at
14 the apogee “of the various privileges recognized in our courts.” *See Halkin I*, 598 F.2d at 7;¹¹
15 *see also, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet*, No. 1:05cv1417, 2006 WL 1391390, at *3-7 (E.D. Va. May 12,
16 2006) (“Given the vitally important purposes it serves, it is clear that while the state secrets
17 privilege is commonly referred to as ‘evidentiary’ in nature, it is in fact a privilege of the highest
18 dignity and significance.”). While Plaintiffs argue that the privilege has no constitutional
19 underpinnings because it finds its origin in the common law, they fail to recognize that common
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21
22 ¹⁰ (U) That deference reflects the constitutional foundation for the state secrets privilege
23 and the practical realities of national security decisions under a constitutional regime of
24 separated powers. Because of the Executive Branch’s particular sphere of constitutional
25 responsibility, it alone has “the necessary expertise in protecting classified information” both to
make the “[p]redictive judgment[s]” underlying a decision to invoke the state secret privilege
and to determine “what constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk.”
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 529.

26 ¹¹ (U) *Cf. id.* at 14 n.9 (statement of Bazelon, J.) (noting that the “constitutional basis of
27 the state secrets privilege” lies in “separation of powers” or “the President’s Article II duties as
Commander in Chief and his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs”).

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1 law privileges can also be rooted in the Constitution. *See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell*, 530
2 U.S. 27, 51-53 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing common law origins of privilege
3 against self-incrimination). In fact, the state secrets privilege's existence at English common law
4 simply underscores its practical importance in a system of government where executive and
5 judicial power are exercised by separate governmental organs.

6 (U) The Ninth Circuit's decision in *Kasza*, on which Plaintiffs rely heavily, is fully
7 consistent with this view. Because the Court concluded that nothing in enactment of the
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act suggested any "Congressional intent to replace the
9 government's evidentiary privilege to withhold sensitive information in litigation," *Kasza*, 133
10 F.3d at 1167-68, the Court never had occasion to—and did not— address whether Congress
11 could, in fact, abrogate the state secrets privilege.

12 (U) Plaintiffs' remaining grounds for claiming that the state secrets privilege does not
13 have a constitutional basis are also meritless. Plaintiffs rely on the statements of two Justices for
14 the suggestion that Congress might modify the *Totten* rule, *see Tenet v. Doe*, 544 U.S. 1, 11
15 (Stevens, J., concurring). But *Tenet* itself made clear that *Totten*'s categorical prohibition
16 against litigation involving clandestine contracts is distinct from the state secrets privilege. *See*
17 *id.* at 7-10; *see also id.* at 11. And Plaintiffs' bare reference to Congress's authority "to declare
18 war," U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, *see Plts. Opp.* at 12, similarly does not support their
19 apparent contention that Congress may therefore diminish the Executive's power to take
20 necessary actions incident to his constitutional role as Commander in Chief and head of state for
21 foreign relations to protect national security.

22 (U) In sum, there is no doubt that the state secrets privilege is solidly rooted in Article II
23 and the separation of powers embodied in our Nation's Constitution.

24 B. (U) The Existence of Statutory Rights of Action and Constitutional Claims Does
25 Not Make the State Secrets Privilege Inapplicable.

26 (U) Plaintiffs also claim that the state secrets privilege is inapplicable to this case because
27 they rely on statutory causes of action and constitutional claims. *See Plts. Opp.* at 17-19. This

1 argument plainly lacks merit.

2 (U) It is obvious that the state secrets privilege is not made inapplicable to a dispute
3 simply because a plaintiff relies on a statutory cause of action. Private parties can sue *only* when
4 Congress has provided them by statute with a cause of action. *See, e.g., Sosa v.*
5 *Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (“[T]his Court has recently and repeatedly said that
6 a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great
7 majority of cases.”); *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“Like substantive federal
8 law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”).
9 Plaintiffs’ proposed rule that anytime a plaintiff relied on a statutory cause of action, the state
10 secrets privilege would not apply clearly is not the law. The same is true for constitutional
11 claims. *See, e.g., Kasza*, 133 F.3d at 1163 (court dismissed statutory claims based on state
12 secrets privilege); *Sterling v. Tenet*, 416 F.3d 338, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (court found that there
13 was “no way for [plaintiff] to prove employment discrimination [under Title VII] without
14 exposing at least some classified details of the covert employment that gives context to the
15 claim,” and dismissed the case). The state secrets privilege is similarly applicable when a
16 plaintiff alleges constitutional claims. *See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger*, 807 F.2d 180, 188 (D.C.
17 Cir. 1986) (the state secrets privilege applicable to national security matters sometimes “ma[kes]
18 it impossible for [plaintiffs] to go forward with their claims for damages based on statutory and
19 constitutional violations” because they cannot obtain “access to the facts.”) (quoting *Halkin II*,
20 690 F.2d at 990 (other citations omitted) *See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger*, 807 F.2d 180, 188
21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding state secrets privilege applicable to national security matters sometimes
22 “ma[kes] it impossible for [plaintiffs] to go forward with their claims for damages based on
23 statutory and constitutional violations” because they cannot obtain “access to the facts.”)
24 (quoting *Halkin v. Helms*, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (other citations omitted); *El-Masri*
25 *v. Tenet*, No. 1:05cv1417, 2006 WL 1391390, at *3-7 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2006) (court dismissed
26 constitutional tort claims because the state secrets in the form of details about a classified
27

1 rendition program were the “very subject of litigation”); *Edmonds v. U.S. Dept. of Justice*, 323 F.
2 Supp. 2d 65, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2004) (court dismissed the plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional
3 claims based on the Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege), *aff’d*, 161 Fed. Appx.
4 6 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).

5 (U) Plaintiffs appear to argue that the availability of the state secrets privilege in cases
6 like this one, where the challenged conduct is alleged electronic surveillance activities, would
7 essentially nullify the statutory causes of action contained in FISA, the Electronic
8 Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), and Title III. *See* Plts. Opp. at 17-19. But this
9 argument assumes that those causes of action apply only in circumstances in which the state
10 secrets privilege would apply. That is simply wrong. Numerous cases brought under these
11 statutes proceed without the invocation of the state secrets privilege by the Government. *See*,
12 *e.g.*, *In re: Grand Jury Proceedings of the Special April 2002 Grand Jury*, 347 F.3d 197, 203-06
13 (7th Cir. 2003) (appellant claimed that his presence before a grand jury was procured through
14 information gained in illegal FISA surveillance, and requested discovery and a hearing on the
15 legality of the surveillance; court reviewed FISA material *in camera*, *ex parte* under Section
16 1806(f) and upheld the legality of the surveillance); *DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe*, 431 F.3d 162, 167
17 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding a private right of action under ECPA where defendants had, “without
18 authorization, intercepted a plaintiff’s encrypted satellite television broadcast”); *Adams v. City of*
19 *Battle Creek*, 250 F.3d 980, 985-86 (6th Cir. 2001) (considering “whether the police department
20 may tap a police officer’s pager without a warrant or notice to the officer,” and remanding to the
21 district court for further factual development to determine whether the defendant municipality
22 violated 18 U.S.C. § 2520). There is simply no inconsistency between Congress’s creation of
23 certain causes of action, on the one hand, and the applicability of the state secrets privileges to
24 certain disputes where it must be raised.

1 C. (U) Section 1806(f) of the FISA Does Not Abrogate the Executive's Authority to
2 Protect National Security through Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege.

3 (U) Plaintiffs also argue that Section 1806(f) of FISA precludes the invocation of the
4 state secrets privilege in this case. *See* Plts. Opp. at 16-23. Again, this argument is wrong for a
5 number of reasons.

6 (U) 1. As a preliminary matter, and as explained by the United States in its Response to
7 Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Points and Authorities in Response to Court's May 17, 2006 Order,
8 at 17-20 (Docket No. 145), because of the invocation of the state secrets privilege, Plaintiffs will
9 be unable to demonstrate that Section 1806(f)— or for that matter, Section 1810, FISA's cause
10 of action— have been triggered. Sections 1806(f) and 1810 are available only to "[a]n aggrieved
11 person." *See* 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f), 1810. But Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they are
12 aggrieved persons under the FISA because the state secrets privilege assertion here covers any
13 information tending to confirm or deny: (a) the alleged intelligence activities; (b) whether
14 AT&T was involved with any such activity; and (c) whether a particular individual's
15 communications were intercepted as a result of any such activity. *See* U.S. Opp. at 17-18. Thus,
16 because basic information necessary to demonstrate that they are aggrieved persons under the
17 FISA is not available to Plaintiffs, they cannot demonstrate the applicability of Sections 1806(f)
18 and 1810.¹²

19 (U) 2. In an attempt to overcome this fundamental problem, Plaintiffs argue that Section
20 1806(f) provides that, when any person asserts that he or she may have been subjected to
21 unlawful electronic surveillance, a court can direct disclosure of materials relating to the
22 surveillance. Plts. Opp. at 21-22. This, Plaintiffs contend, demonstrates Congress' intent to
23 abrogate the state secrets privilege.

24
25 ¹² (U) Section 1806(f) is applicable only where "[a]n aggrieved person" has been
26 unlawfully subject to "an electronic surveillance." *See* 50 U.S.C. § 1810; *see also id.* § 1806(f).
27 But, the invocation of the state secrets privilege precludes Plaintiffs' ability to show that
28 electronic surveillance as defined by FISA actually occurred, and also destroys AT&T's ability
to defend itself against such a cause of action.

1 (U) Plaintiffs' argument completely misinterprets Section 1806(f). In Section 1806(f),
2 Congress established a procedure for a court to follow when deciding the legality of a particular
3 electronic surveillance that has *already been disclosed* by the Government. Section 1806(f)'s
4 applicability only to such circumstances is demonstrated by the fact that by its very terms,
5 Section 1806(f) applies only to three specific contexts in which an aggrieved person has already
6 been notified of the surveillance: *first*, when a governmental entity gives notice under
7 Section 1806(c) or (d) that it intends to use evidence obtained from such surveillance against the
8 aggrieved person; *second*, when the aggrieved person seeks to suppress that evidence under
9 Section 1806(e); and *third*, when the aggrieved person moves or requests "to discover or obtain"
10 FISA "applications, orders or other materials" related to the surveillance or the evidence or
11 information derived from the surveillance. *See* 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f); *cf. id.* § 1804(a) (FISA
12 applications); *id.* § 1805 (orders); *id.* § 1804(c), (d) (discussing other materials related to
13 surveillance).

14 (U) Section 1806(f) thus applies only when there has been acknowledged surveillance
15 under FISA. In those circumstances, and "if" the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
16 General or a designated Assistant Attorney General certifies that disclosure or a hearing would
17 damage national security, Section 1806(f) requires the district court, "notwithstanding any other
18 law to the contrary," to conduct an *ex parte* and *in camera* proceeding to review the materials
19 relevant to this determination *ex parte* and *in camera*. Section 1806(f) is thus an affirmative
20 grant of authority that allows the district court to conduct *in camera*, *ex parte* proceedings at the
21 request of the Attorney General, notwithstanding any other law that might preclude such
22 proceedings, but *only* in those limited circumstances in which Section 1806(f) applies.

23 (U) The text of Section 1806 accordingly shows that it has nothing to do with a case such
24 as this. The clear purpose of the section is to authorize a procedure for *in camera*, *ex parte*
25 review when requested by the government after discovery is sought as to a particular known
26 FISA surveillance. It is a mechanism authorized by Congress to consider classified information
27

1 in that particular setting—not the exclusive means of addressing disputes involving classified
2 surveillance activities. This should be apparent when one considers that a state secrets assertion
3 is far more than a procedure for resolving discovery disputes as to classified matters, but reflects
4 a constitutional determination by the Executive that state secrets that are necessary to resolve the
5 entire case cannot be disclosed. Here, wholly apart from the procedures for addressing
6 discovery, the fact remains that AT&T could not file an Answer that would admit or deny
7 Plaintiffs’ allegations because the very subject matter of the action involves a state secret, and
8 the court—even if it were to find unlawfulness upon *in camera*, *ex parte* review—could not then
9 proceed to adjudicate the very question of awarding damages because to do so would confirm
10 Plaintiffs’ allegations.

11 (U) 3. Beyond this, nothing in Section 1806(f) demonstrates a clear intention on the part
12 of Congress to abrogate the state secrets privilege. It is well-established that when Congress
13 seeks to restrict or regulate the constitutionally-based powers of the Executive through
14 legislation, it must make that intention clear. *See Swan v. Clinton*, 100 F.3d 973, 981 (D.C. Cir.
15 1996) (recognizing that there must be “affirmative evidence” that Congress intended to restrict
16 Executive power); *Armstrong v. Bush*, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Congress must make
17 a “clear statement” in order to “restrict[] or regulat[e] presidential action,” because “[I]egislation
18 regulating presidential action . . . raises ‘serious’ practical, political, and constitutional
19 questions”) (citing *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)); *see also Public Citizen v.*
20 *Dep’t of Justice*, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (“[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress intended
21 to press ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it
22 courted those perils.”). As the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]n traditionally sensitive areas, such
23 as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
24 legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the
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1 judicial decision.” *Bass*, 404 U.S. at 350.¹³ Moreover, even if Plaintiffs were correct that the
2 state secrets privilege is “just” a common law privilege, courts have repeatedly held that statutes
3 will not be read to overcome the common law without a clear congressional expression of an
4 intent to do. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[i]t is a well-established principle of
5 statutory construction that ‘[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the
6 language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.’” *Norfolk Redevelopment and*
7 *Housing Authority v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Norfolk*, 464 U.S. 30, 35-36
8 (1983) (citation omitted); *see also United States v. Texas*, 507 U.S. 529, 533 (1993) (“In order to
9 abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by
10 the common law.”) (internal citations omitted). Nowhere in Section 1806(f) is there any
11 indication, let alone a clear statement, that Congress had intended to restrict the applicability of
12 the state secrets privilege in cases like this. The text of the statute, like the rest of FISA, contains
13 no mention of the state secrets privilege, and certainly no indication that Congress intended to
14 limit it. Indeed, we are aware of no discussion, or even mention, of the state secrets privilege in
15 the legislative history of FISA—let alone an affirmative statement by Congress that it intended
16 to restrict the Executive’s authority to assert the privilege to protect foreign intelligence
17 surveillance activities. *See, e.g.*, H.R. Report No. 95-1273 (1978); H.R. Conf. Rep 95-1720
18 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-701 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-604 (1977).

19 (U) Plaintiffs’ only argument to the contrary is that Congress must have been aware of
20 the state secrets privilege when it enacted the FISA. *See* Plts. Opp. at 19. But that is a non
21 sequitur. Congress may have been aware of the privilege without intending to abrogate it, and
22 Plaintiffs’ argument falls well short of demonstrating a clear intent by Congress to attempt to
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24 ¹³ (U) This clear statement rule makes perfect sense in the context of the legislative
25 process provided in the Constitution; if Congress has made plain in a bill that it intends to restrict
26 or abrogate Executive power, the President is placed on notice and has the ability to determine
27 whether to veto the bill. Without a clear statement, Executive power could be abrogated through
stealth legislation that the President had no reason to think was meant to encroach on his powers.

1 restrict the Executive's ability to protect foreign intelligence surveillance through invocation of
2 that privilege. Plaintiffs' assertion that Congress can restrict Executive authority through such
3 an unarticulated implication is simply contrary to established law.¹⁴

4 (U) 4. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the availability of the state secrets privilege in a case
5 involving a challenge to the legality of electronic surveillance under the FISA would essentially
6 nullify the judicial review provision of Section 1806(f). *See* Plts. Opp. at 22. Like Plaintiffs'
7 argument that the state secrets privilege is inconsistent with statutory causes of action relating to
8 electronic surveillance, *see supra*, this argument is mistaken.

9 (U) Plaintiffs' argument again assumes that Section 1806(f) applies only in circumstances
10 in which the state secrets privilege would apply—an assumption that is simply wrong. Section
11 1806(f) is very much a viable provision that is often utilized where an “aggrieved person”
12 challenges the legality of electronic surveillance. In a typical Section 1806(f) proceeding, an
13 individual is notified that the Government intends to use the results of FISA surveillance against
14 him in a criminal or other proceedings (as the Government must do in certain circumstances), *see*
15 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c); the individual files a motion to suppress or other similar motion to suppress
16 or seek disclosure of the FISA material, *id* § 1806(e), (f); and the court reviews the legality of the
17 surveillance under the FISA, *id*. § 1806(f).

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20 ¹⁴ (U) Even if the FISA could somehow be interpreted to attempt implicitly to preclude
21 the Executive's ability to assert the state secrets privilege over matters possibly covered by
22 FISA, the statute should not be interpreted in that manner because doing so would pose a very
23 serious constitutional question about the validity of the statute in light of the Executive's powers
24 under Article II of the Constitution. *See Public Citizen*, 491 U.S. at 466 (“It has long been an
25 axiom of statutory interpretation that ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
26 would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
27 problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress’”) (quoting
28 *Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988)); *Nadarajah v. Gonzales*, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an
alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute
to avoid such problems.”) (quoting *INS v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001)) (citation
omitted).

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1 (U) For example, in *United States v. Hammoud*, 381 F.3d 316, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2004),
2 *vacated and remanded on other grounds*, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), the defendant moved to
3 suppress recorded telephone conversions that were obtained through a FISA wiretap. Pursuant
4 to Section 1806(f), the court reviewed the FISA applications and supporting materials *in camera*
5 and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant was an agent of a
6 foreign power and denied the motion to suppress. *Id.* And in *United States v. Squillacote*, 221
7 F.3d 542, 552 (4th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 971 (2001), the defendants sought to
8 suppress the fruits of the FISA surveillance. *Id.* at 553. Pursuant to Section 1806(f), the
9 Attorney General filed an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversarial hearing would
10 harm the national security of the United States, and the district court reviewed the applications
11 and other materials *in camera* without disclosing the material to the defendants. *Squillacote*, 221
12 F.3d at 553-54. The court found the surveillance lawful, and the Fourth Circuit agreed after
13 reviewing the matter *de novo*. *Id.* at 554. *See also, e.g., United States v. Johnson*, 952 F.2d 565,
14 571-73 (1st Cir. 1992) (court upheld legality of FISA surveillance used against defendants at
15 trial). In none of these cases did the United States assert the state secrets privilege.

16 (U) Thus, Section 1806(f) is often utilized by the courts, and the applicability of the state
17 secrets privilege to some cases in no way negates the purpose of this provision or any other
18 provision of the FISA, as Plaintiffs claim. That should not be surprising, for this case is far from
19 the typical case brought under the FISA. Plaintiffs assert a broad attack on the legality of an
20 entire surveillance program instituted in the wake of September 11, 2001, over which the United
21 States has properly asserted the state secrets privilege to avoid grave harm to national security.
22 Section 1806(f) simply has no applicability in this context, and certainly does not evidence a
23 clear Congressional intent to abrogate the state secrets privilege.

1 D. (U) Congress Also Has Not Abrogated the Statutory Provisions Protecting
2 Against Disclosure of NSA Activities.

3 (U) Even if Plaintiffs were correct that FISA wholly abrogates the applicability of the
4 state secrets privilege in this case (they are not), as the United States demonstrated in its Motion
5 to Dismiss, two different statutory privileges—Section 6 of the NSA Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
6 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the
7 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638
8 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1)—preclude disclosure of the information at
9 issue in this case and therefore require dismissal.¹⁵ Plaintiffs argue in passing that these statutory
10 protections do not conflict with Plaintiffs’ reading of FISA, and that if they did, FISA would
11 govern. *See* Plts. Opp. at 24-26. Plaintiffs’ arguments are contrary to the plain language of both
12 statutes and, with respect to the NSA Act, also are contrary to the well-established rule that when
13 two statutory provisions potentially conflict, the more specific provision should prevail. *See*
14 *Morton v. Mancari*, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“[A] specific statute will not be controlled or
15 nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”).

16 (U) Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73
17 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, could not be more explicit:

18 *[N]othing in this Act or any other law . . . shall be construed to require the*
19 *disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency,*
of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles,
salaries, or number of persons employed by such agency.

20 *Id.* This unequivocal and precise language, which Plaintiffs simply disregard, is fatal to their
21 argument. By the plain terms of this provision, FISA—which is “any other law”—cannot be
22 construed to require the disclosure of *any* information with respect to the activities of the NSA.
23 *See Linder v. Nat’l Security Agency*, 94 F.3d 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The protection afforded
24 by section 6 is, by its very terms, absolute.”); *Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat’l Security*
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26 ¹⁵ (U) Plaintiffs do not contest that these statutory privileges were properly asserted, nor
27 do they contest that the statutory privileges cover the information at issue in this case.

1 *Agency*, 610 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that Section 6 reflects the “congressional
2 judgment that in order to preserve national security, information elucidating the subjects
3 specified ought to be safe from forced exposure”). Plaintiffs cite no authority that FISA trumps
4 Section 6 and could require the disclosure of NSA information, nor do they cite any authority
5 involving statutory construction in the area of national security information. Indeed, because
6 Section 6 is a more specific statute—relating to information only about the NSA, and not to
7 other agencies that utilize FISA—to the extent that there is any conflict between Section 6 and
8 FISA, Section 6 must apply.

9 (U) Similarly, Section 102A(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
10 Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 50 U.S.C. §
11 403-1(i)(1) precludes the disclosure of information necessary to adjudicate this case. This
12 statute requires the Director of National Intelligence to “protect intelligence sources and methods
13 from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1). No provision of the FISA preempts the
14 DNI’s authority to protect against the disclosure of this type of information in this case.

15 (U) CONCLUSION

16 (U) For the foregoing reasons as well as those provided in the Assertion of the State
17 Secrets Privilege and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by the
18 United States, the Court should:

19 (U) 1. Uphold the United States’ assertion of the military and state secrets privilege and
20 exclude from this case the information identified in the Declarations of John D. Negroponte,
21 Director of National Intelligence of the United States, and Keith B. Alexander, Director of the
22 National Security Agency; and

23 (U) 2. Dismiss this action because adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims risks or requires the
24 disclosure of protected state secrets and would thereby risk or cause exceptionally grave harm to
25 the national security of the United States.

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Respectfully submitted,

PETER D. KEISLER
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division

CARL J. NICHOLS
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

DOUGLAS N. LETTER
Terrorism Litigation Counsel

JOSEPH H. HUNT
Director, Federal Programs Branch

s/ Anthony J. Coppolino
ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
Special Litigation Counsel
tony.coppolino@usdoj.gov

s/ Renée S. Orleans
RENÉE S. ORLEANS
renee.orleans@usdoj.gov

s/ Andrew H. Tannenbaum
ANDREW H. TANNENBAUM
Trial Attorneys
andrew.tannenbaum@usdoj.gov
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: (202) 514-4782/(202) 514-4263/(202)514-4504
Fax: (202) 616-8460/(202) 616-8202

DATED: June 16, 2006

Attorneys for the United States of America

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing **UNITED STATES' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSERTION OF THE MILITARY AND STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, Case No. C 06-0672-VRW** will be served by means of the Court's CM/ECF system, which will send notifications of such filing to the following:

Electronic Frontier Foundation
Cindy Cohn
Lee Tien
Kurt Opsahl
Kevin S. Bankston
Corynne McSherry
James S. Tyre
545 Shotwell Street
San Francisco, CA 94110

Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP
Reed R. Kathrein
Jeff D. Friedman
Shana E. Scarlett
100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Traber & Voorhees
Bert Voorhees
Theresa M. Traber
128 North Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 204
Pasadena, CA 91103

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
Bruce A. Ericson
David L. Anderson
Patrick S. Thompson
Jacob R. Sorensen
Brian J. Wong
50 Fremont Street
PO Box 7880
San Francisco, CA 94120-7880

Sidley & Austin LLP
David W. Carpenter
Bradford Berenson
Edward R. McNicholas
David L. Lawson
1501 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

s/ Andrew H. Tannenbaum