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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

TASH HEPTING, GREGORY HICKS, CAROLYN JEWEL and ERIK KNUTZEN on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AT&T CORP., AT&T INC. and DOES 1-20, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. C-06-0672-VRW

MOTION OF DEFENDANT AT&T CORP. TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Date: June 8, 2006
Time: 2 p.m.
Courtroom: 6, 17th Floor
Judge: Hon. Vaughn R. Walker

Filed concurrently:
1. Request for judicial notice
2. Proposed order

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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Thursday, June 8, 2006, at 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Chief Judge, in Courtroom 6, 17th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, defendant **AT&T CORP.** ("AT&T") will move and hereby does move, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 8, referred to hereafter as the "Amended Complaint" or the "FAC") filed by plaintiffs Tash Hepting, Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel and Erik Knutzen (collectively, "plaintiffs") on February 22, 2006.

This motion is made on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to plead that defendants lack statutory and common law immunity from suit and that plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue this lawsuit.

This motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the memorandum that follows, the request for judicial notice filed herewith, the administrative motion filed herewith, all pleadings and records on file in this action, and any other arguments and evidence presented to this Court at or before the hearing on this motion.

ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

1. On the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs, have plaintiffs met their burden to negate the statutory and common law immunities applicable to telecommunications providers that are requested and authorized by the government to lend assistance to government surveillance activities?

2. Do the named plaintiffs have standing to challenge alleged government surveillance activities if their complaint does not allege facts—as opposed to unsupported belief—suggesting that they have been or will be the targets of such surveillance?

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

This lawsuit arises out of a disagreement with the federal government's national security policies. Through this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs seek to challenge intelligence activities allegedly carried out by the National Security Agency ("NSA") at the direction of the President, as part of the government's effort to prevent terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and other associated groups. Plaintiffs believe these activities to be unlawful, allege that AT&T is assisting the NSA with those activities, and seek through this lawsuit to hold AT&T liable for its alleged assistance. Whatever the truth of plaintiffs' allegations or the merits of the underlying dispute over the lawfulness of the NSA surveillance activities acknowledged by the President (hereinafter "the Terrorist Surveillance Program" or "Program"), this case has been brought by the wrong plaintiffs and it names the wrong defendants. The real dispute is between any actual targets of the Program and the government.[1] It cannot involve telecommunications carriers (such as AT&T) who are alleged only to have acted in accord with requests for assistance from the highest levels of the government in sensitive matters of national security. And the dispute does not involve average AT&T customers (such as plaintiffs) with no perceptible connection to al Qaeda or international terrorism.

Yet rather than seeking to vindicate their position through the political process, plaintiffs have sued AT&T for allegedly providing the government with access to its facilities, even though they do not allege that AT&T acted independently or for any reasons

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[1] There are numerous other cases pending around the country that challenge the Program directly, either through complaints filed by public interest groups or in the context of criminal cases or asset-blocking actions in which terrorism suspects have suffered concrete adverse consequences due to governmental enforcement actions. *See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. NSA et al.*, Civ. 06-10204 (E.D. Mich.); *Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush et al.*, Civ. 06-313 (S.D.N.Y.); *Electronic Privacy Information Center, et al. v. Department of Justice*, Civ. No. 06-00096 (HHK) (D.D.C.); *Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., et al. v. George W. Bush, et al.*, CV-06-274-MO (D. Ore.); *United States v. al-Timimi*, No. 1:04cr385 (E.D. Va.); *United States v. Aref*, Crim. No. 04-CR-402 (N.D.N.Y.); *United States v. Albanna, et al*,. Crim. No. 02-CR-255-S (W.D.N.Y); *United States* v. *Hayat, et al.*, Crim. No. S-05-240-GEB (E.D. Cal.). Copies of select related complaints and other filings are attached to defendants' request for judicial notice, filed herewith ("RFJN") as Exs. A through I.

of its own. On the contrary, plaintiffs allege that AT&T acted at all times at the direction and with the approval of the United States government. *See, e.g.*, FAC ¶ 82. If these allegations were true, it is the government and not AT&T that would be obliged to answer for the lawfulness of the challenged intelligence activities: both Congress and the courts have conferred blanket immunity from suit on providers of communications services who respond to apparently lawful requests for national security assistance from the federal government. We are aware of no case in which a telecommunications carrier – even when known to be involved in such activities – has ever been held liable for allowing or assisting government-directed surveillance. As a result, whether or not it had any role in the Program, AT&T is entitled to immediate dismissal.

Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege any fact suggesting that they themselves have suffered any known, concrete harm from the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Indeed, their allegations expressly place them *outside* the category of targets of the Program, making the likelihood that they have suffered any sort of injury from the Program even lower than the likelihood that would apply to any other American who occasionally makes international calls or surfs the Internet. They thus lack Article III standing. Their disagreement with the government's surveillance activities may be passionate and sincerely felt, but a passionate and sincere disagreement with governmental policy is not enough to confer standing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE CASE.

A. Background.

Plaintiffs allege that AT&T provides the NSA with access to its telecommunications facilities and databases as part of an electronic surveillance program authorized directly by the President. *See* FAC ¶¶ 3-6.[2] Plaintiffs claim that "at all relevant times, the government instigated, directed and/or tacitly approved all of the . . . acts of AT&T Corp." *Id.* ¶ 82. Plaintiffs do not allege that AT&T carried out any actual electronic surveillance; rather, the

[2] As it must, AT&T accepts plaintiffs' allegations as true solely for purposes of this motion, and nothing herein should be construed as confirmation by AT&T of any involvement in the Program or other classified activities.

gravamen of the complaint is that AT&T allegedly provided access to databases and telecommunications facilities that enabled the government to do so. *Id.* ¶ 6 ("AT&T Corp. has opened its key telecommunications facilities and databases to direct access by the NSA and/or other government agencies . . ."); *see also id.* ¶¶ 38, 41-42, 46, 51, 61.

Plaintiffs base their allegations on newspaper reports of the classified Terrorist Surveillance Program that the President has stated he authorized after September 11, 2001 and later reauthorized more than 30 times. FAC ¶¶ 3, 32-33. But plaintiffs' reading of the newspapers is selective. They refer to public statements of the President and the Attorney General, *see id.* ¶¶ 33-35, but they omit the Attorney General's description of two key characteristics of the Terrorist Surveillance Program: first, it intercepts the contents of communications where "one party to the communication is outside the United States"—in other words, international communications; second, it intercepts the contents of communications only if the government has "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda."[3]

Plaintiffs purport to bring this case on behalf of a massive, nationwide class of all individuals who are or were subscribers to AT&T's services at any time after September 2001, and a subclass of California residents. FAC ¶¶ 65-68. But their putative classes expressly exclude the targets of the program described by the Attorney General—any "foreign powers . . . or agents of foreign powers . . ., including without limitation anyone who knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefore." *Id.* ¶ 70 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs do not allege that they themselves communicate with anyone who might be affiliated with al Qaeda.

[3] Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, *available at* http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html (Dec. 19, 2005) (statement of Attorney General Gonzales), attached as RFJN Ex. J and also as Attachment 2 to Plaintiff's request for judicial notice (Dkt. 20).

B. Standards for deciding this motion.

This motion is made under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a case is properly dismissed when the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); *Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). The court must consider whether, assuming the truth of the complaint's factual allegations, the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. Dismissal can be based "on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Only allegations of fact are taken as true under Rule 12(b)(6). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." *In re VeriFone Sec. Litig.*, 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1993); *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994); *Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors*, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), it is presumed that the court lacks jurisdiction, and the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. *Kokonnen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994). Absent jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the case. When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the court's jurisdiction as a matter of fact, the court is not limited to the allegations of the complaint and may consider extrinsic evidence, including matters of public record. *Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.*, 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); *White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. ARGUMENT.

A. THE FAC FAILS TO PLEAD THE ABSENCE OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

Both Congress and the courts have recognized an overriding policy interest in having telecommunications carriers cooperate with government requests for national security or foreign intelligence assistance, leaving the defense of substantive challenges to such activity to the government or the political process. For this reason, carriers who respond to apparently lawful requests for assistance from the federal government enjoy statutory and common-law immunity from suit. The FAC does not allege that AT&T

engaged in any surveillance of its own or for its own reasons, or undertook any action without the direction or approval of the federal government; in fact, it affirmatively alleges the opposite. *See* FAC ¶¶ 82-84. Thus, even assuming *arguendo* the truth of plaintiffs' allegations, plaintiffs have failed to negate the statutory and common-law immunities that protect carriers such as AT&T from suit, and AT&T is entitled to immediate dismissal. Plaintiffs ultimately rest their complaint on an extreme legal theory that is simply wrong.

1. The FAC fails to plead the absence of absolute statutory immunity.

a. Numerous statutes provide telecommunications carriers absolute immunity for assisting governmental activities.

In numerous places in the United States Code, Congress has made clear that where the government authorizes a communications provider to cooperate with governmental surveillance, that provider is immune from suit. The FAC alleges only that AT&T acted as an agent of, and at the direction of, the government, and that the Program was authorized and repeatedly reauthorized by the President. FAC ¶¶ 3-6, 82-85. Thus, whatever one's views of the Program, assuming for the sake of argument that the allegations of the FAC were true, it could not be challenged by suing AT&T.

Both 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) provide absolute immunity from any and all claims arising out of the surveillance activities alleged in the FAC:

> *Notwithstanding any other law*, providers of wire or electronic communication service, their officers, employees and agents . . . are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of [FISA]. . . if such provider, its officers, employees, or agents, . . has been provided with – . . . .
>
> (B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518 (7) of this title or the Attorney General of the United States that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). Immunity under this provision is absolute: "*No cause of action shall lie in any court* against any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officer, employees, or agents, . . . for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a . . . certification under this chapter." *Id*. (emphasis supplied).

In like fashion, the ECPA confers absolute immunity on communication providers acting with government authorization:

> *No cause of action shall lie in any court* against any provider of wire and electronic communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a . . . statutory authorization, or certification under this chapter.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (emphasis added).[4]

Together, these provisions confer absolute immunity on communications carriers authorized to assist the government in foreign intelligence surveillance. This immunity ensures that intelligence matters will not be aired in the nation's courts and eliminates the risk that courts of general jurisdiction will issue orders that might impede the government's ability to obtain intelligence that may be critical to protecting the country against foreign attack. This immunity also ensures that the government can obtain prompt cooperation from communications providers in meeting national security needs, without the chilling effect of potential civil liability. Providers will almost always lack the factual information necessary to evaluate the necessity or propriety of classified intelligence activities; to assure that they do not have to argue or equivocate when the government asks for help, the risk of

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[4] "[T]his chapter" includes 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) , which cross references 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii), making clear that the immunity extends to certifications for foreign intelligence surveillance under the latter provision. FISA and the Communications Act both contain analogous immunity provisions. *See* 50 U.S.C. § 1805(i) (immunity for providing assistance "in accordance with a court order or request for emergency assistance under this chapter"); 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)(6) (immunity for providing investigative assistance "on demand of other lawful authority"); *see also* 18 U.S.C. § 3124(d) (immunity for compliance with pen register requests).

liability for wrongful foreign intelligence surveillance activities is placed not on the providers but on the government.

b. Plaintiffs have the burden of pleading facts sufficient to avoid these immunities.

Congress gave plaintiffs the burden to plead specific facts demonstrating the absence of immunity when suing a communications provider for allegedly assisting the government with surveillance. By providing that "no cause of action shall lie" against providers who have acted in accord with governmental authorizations, Congress made the absence of immunity an element of plaintiffs' claims – and not an affirmative defense.

That is reflected in the provisions of the Act that provide for causes of action. For example, the FAC's Count III alleges interception and disclosure of communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 under a right of action created by 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). In defining that right of action, Congress provided that:

> *Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii)*, any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.

Id. (emphasis added). The highlighted language makes clear that, to state a claim for a violation of § 2520(a), a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the immunities of § 2511(2)(a)(ii) do not apply. None of the other statutory exceptions to § 2511—*e.g.*, the switchboard-operator exception (§ 2511(2)(a)(i)), the FCC exception (§ 2511(2)(b)), or the consent exception (§ 2511(2)(c))—is similarly referenced in § 2520's definition of the cause of action. Only the absence of an immunity under § 2511(2)(a)(ii) was singled out by Congress as a necessary element of any claim under § 2520.[5] *Cf. Williams v. Poulos*,

[5] 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) further provides that it "is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or *any other law*" (emphasis added) that the provider acted in "good faith reliance" on "a statutory authorization" or based on a "good faith determination" that the required authorization under § 2511(2)(a)(ii) existed. The (continued…)

11 F.3d 271, 284 (1st Cir. 1993) (plaintiff's burden of proof in an action under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 includes demonstrating that § 2511 immunity does not apply); *Thompson v. Dulaney*, 970 F.2d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 1992) (same). Because § 2511(2)(a)(ii) immunity precludes liability on any theory in any court, the same rule necessarily applies to all causes of action based on the same alleged conduct.

The legislative history of ECPA confirms that Congress intended providers to be relieved of the burdens of litigation when complying with government requests for assistance. With respect to § 2520(a), authorizing civil suits against violators of § 2511, Senate Report No. 99-541 (1986) states:

> Proposed subsection 2520(a) of title 18 authorizes the commencement of a civil suit. There is one exception. A civil action will not lie where the requirements of section 2511(2)(a)(ii) of title 18 are met. With regard to that exception, the Committee intends that the following procedural standards will apply:
>
> (1) The *complaint must allege* that a wire or electronic communications service provider (or one of its employees): (a) disclosed the existence of a wiretap; (b) acted without a facially valid court order or certification; (c) acted beyond the scope of a court order or certification or (d) acted on bad faith. . . . . *If the complaint fails to make any of these allegations, the defendant can move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.*

Id. at 26 (reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3580) (emphasis supplied). In addition, the Report explains that "in the absence of [a criminal] prosecution and conviction [for the acts complained of], it is the *plaintiff's burden* to establish that the requirements of [section 2520] are met." *Id.* at 27. (emphasis supplied). The specifics of other statutes at issue reinforce this understanding.[6]

(…continued)
designation of "good faith reliance" as a "defense" indicates that § 2511(2)(a)(ii) delineates something that is more than a defense – *i.e.*, an affirmative requirement that any § 2520(a) claim must allege that § 2511(2)(a)(ii) does not apply.

[6] For example, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (FAC Count IV) expressly includes the absence of § 2511(2)(a)(ii) immunity as an element of plaintiffs' claim. *Cf. United States v.* (continued…)

Well-established judicial precedents and principles of national security law reinforce the wisdom and necessity of these congressionally-mandated pleading rules. Courts considering suits involving secret military or intelligence programs have long held that the question of immunity should be decided at the outset. In *Tenet v. Doe*, 544 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2004), for example, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a line of precedent stretching back more than a century barring lawsuits against the government based on secret espionage agreements. This rule was announced in *Totten v. United States*, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1876), which barred an action by a man who claimed that President Lincoln had hired him at $200 a month to spy on the "insurrectionary States." *Totten*, 92 U.S. at 105-06. The rule holds that "where success [in litigation] depends upon the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship," *Tenet*, 125 S. Ct. at 1236, a lawsuit must be "'dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence,'" *id.* at 1237 (quoting *United States v. Reynolds*, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (emphasis omitted)). The *Tenet* Court specifically noted that the "absolute protection" afforded by the *Totten* immunity was "designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry." *Tenet*, 125 S. Ct. at 1235 n.4, 1237. As such, national security-related immunity "represents the sort of threshold question we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction." *Id.* at 1235 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The statutory immunities provided to telecommunications carriers in this context are, like the rules of dismissal in *Totten* and *Tenet* – and for like reasons – designed to

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(…continued)
Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1312 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The language of the amendment to § 605 providing that "*except* as authorized by chapter 119, title 18, United States Code . . . .' no person may disclose certain wire communications, is a clear manifestation of Congress' intent that § 605 shall not limit § 2511 investigations."). And 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), (2), and (3) (FAC Counts V and VI) are subject to the same requirement. Section 2702 states that "*[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)*," it is illegal for persons or entities providing either an "electronic communication service" or a "remote computing service" to make certain disclosures. Subsection (b)(2) makes lawful the disclosure of the contents of communications "as otherwise authorized in section 2517, *2511(2)(a)*, or 2703 of this title" (emphasis added). Because the statutory prohibition itself expressly incorporates and permits any disclosure authorized by § 2511(2)(a), these statutory causes of action, too, make the absence of § 2511(2)(a)(ii) immunity an element of the claim and part of plaintiffs' pleading burden.

provide "absolute protection" from such claims. *Id.* at 1236-37. Sections 2711(2)(a)(ii) and 2703(3) both specify that "[n]o cause of action shall lie in any court" if a provider is acting pursuant to governmental authorization. This powerful language assures communications providers that cooperation with the government will not subject them to the burdens of litigation. Where parties are entitled to immunity from suit, "there is a strong public interest in protecting [them] from the costs associated with the defense of damages actions"—an interest best served by dismissing questionable lawsuits expeditiously. *Crawford-El v. Britton*, 523 U.S. 574, 596, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).

Immunities such as these are "designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry." *Tenet*, 125 S. Ct. at 1235 n.4. That makes particular sense where, as here, if plaintiffs' allegations were correct, defendants would not be able to mount a factual defense without violating legal prohibitions on disclosure of classified information pertaining to surveillance. *See, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) (criminalizing disclosure of classified information "concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States"); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (forbidding disclosure of "any interception or surveillance" or the "device" used to accomplish it pursuant to government authorized programs). Unless suits making allegations like those in this case (whether true or false) could be dismissed on immunity grounds at the pleading stage, it would be impossible to respect the imperative to "preclude judicial inquiry" into sensitive matters involving the sources and methods of gathering foreign intelligence that Congress and the Executive have concluded must be kept confidential.

c. Plaintiffs fail to meet their pleading burden and are relying on extreme and erroneous legal theories.

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of alleging specific facts that negate the applicability of statutory immunity. Plaintiffs allege no facts suggesting that, even assuming AT&T engaged in the conduct alleged, AT&T lacked government authorization

under § 2511(2)(a)(ii).[7] Nor could they: the facts necessary to make (or refute) such an allegation – even assuming they existed – would be completely unavailable to plaintiffs and impossible for either party ever to bring into court.

But the flaw in the FAC is even deeper: its allegations, even if true, affirmatively tend to suggest immunity. The gravamen of the FAC is that AT&T allegedly complied with requests to assist in a foreign intelligence program that had been authorized at the highest levels of government. FAC ¶¶ 84-85. Plaintiffs assert that the President himself authorized the Program more than 30 times, *see* FAC ¶ 33, and the Attorney General himself has personally defended it. Most pertinently, plaintiffs expressly allege that "the government instigated, directed and/or tacitly approved all of the . . . acts of AT&T Corp," FAC ¶ 82, and that "AT&T Corp. acted as an instrument or agent of the government," *id.* ¶ 85. This, by its terms, is an allegation that AT&T acted in accord with governmental authorization. There is no suggestion in the FAC that, if AT&T acted, it did so on its own, for its own purposes, or outside the governmental authorization plaintiffs allege.

Plaintiffs have elsewhere admitted these points. *See* Pl. Mem. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 19-21. In their injunction papers, they acknowledge that the relevant federal statutes preclude suits against carriers when those carriers receive certain governmental authorizations. Yet here, too, plaintiffs do *not* contend that such authorizations were not provided to AT&T in connection with its alleged assistance. Rather, plaintiffs' arguments assume that governmental authorizations *were* provided to AT&T, and then go on to defend their complaint under an extreme legal theory that is simply wrong.

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[7] The conclusory allegation that AT&T's actions were "without lawful authorization," FAC ¶ 81, cannot meet this burden. In this setting, "a 'firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' is fully warranted," including but not limited to "insist[ing] that the plaintiff 'put forward specific nonconclusory factual allegations' . . . in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment." *Crawford-El*, 523 U.S. at 598 (*quoting Siegert* v. *Gilley*, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). In any event, FAC ¶ 81 states a legal conclusion that need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss. *Warren*, 328 F.3d at 1139, 1141 n.5.

In particular, their legal theory is that, although § 2511(2)(a)(ii) and § 2703(e) categorically provide that "no cause of action lies" against a telecommunications carrier who has acted in accord with governmental authorization, these provisions somehow do not mean what they say. Rather, plaintiffs contend that immunity exists only where authorization has been issued in one of the four circumstances in which FISA specifically authorizes warrantless surveillance and that none of these conditions exists here. This contention is wrong. If Congress had intended to narrow the immunity to those four situations, it would have said so. Congress did not do so because it recognized that where the Attorney General or other responsible officials have authorized surveillance in sensitive areas of national security, it cannot be the province of telecommunications carriers to second-guess them, especially without having the facts to do so.[8]

The legal authorities that plaintiffs cite are inapposite. Plaintiffs rely on *Jacobson v. Rose*, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978), but that was a case in which the telephone company had *not* acted in accord with a governmental authorization and in which it did not enjoy the absolute immunity of § 2511(2)(a). The Court thus addressed the issue whether the company could rely on the separate good faith immunity conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 2520. Here, by contrast, the issue is absolute statutory immunity, and plaintiffs' failure to plead its inapplicability cannot be cured by their legal argument that the Program falls outside the four categories of warrantless surveillance authorized by the FISA statute. Even if that were true, it would be a potential legal problem only for the government; it does not affect

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[8] To support their attempt to rewrite the immunity provisions of the statutes, plaintiffs refer to the provision of FISA that states that its procedures are the exclusive means of conducting certain surveillance and interceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(f). But this argument ignores that, when FISA was enacted, Congress clearly understood that there were significant areas of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance the President would continue to direct solely pursuant to his inherent constitutional authority . S. Rep. No. 95-604 at 64 (1978), *reprinted in* 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3965 ((FISA "does not deal with international signals intelligence activities as currently engaged in by the National Security Agency and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United States"). Even after the passage of FISA, the courts have recognized the President's continuing constitutional authority in this area, *See, e.g., In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).

the immunity of telecommunications providers under § 2511(2)(a).

In short, whatever the merits of the current national debate over the legal authority for the Program, plaintiffs are here alleging only that AT&T acted pursuant to governmental authorization. As such, their allegations are insufficient to permit this lawsuit to go forward in light of the clear statutory immunities enacted by Congress.

2. The FAC fails to plead the absence of absolute common-law immunity.

Not only the Congress but also the courts have long recognized the importance of insulating against suit telecommunications carriers that cooperate with foreign intelligence or law enforcement investigations conducted by the government. The statutory immunities described above were enacted against a backdrop of strong common-law immunities. These common-law immunities too require dismissal of this lawsuit.

Statutes in derogation of the common law "are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." *United States* v. *Texas*, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statutory immunities evince no congressional purpose to displace, rather than supplement, the common law. *See, e.g.*, *Tapley* v. *Collins*, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[t]he Federal Wiretap Act lacks the specific, unequivocal language necessary to abrogate the qualified immunity defense"). On the contrary, the statutes and their legislative history bespeak a strong policy consistent with the policies that inspired the common-law immunities.

The common-law immunities grew out of a recognition that telecommunications carriers should not be subject to civil liability for cooperating with government officials conducting surveillance activities. That is true whether or not the surveillance was lawful, so long as the government officials requesting cooperation assured the carrier that it was.

Smith v. *Nixon*, 606 F.2d 1183, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1979), illustrates the point. Hedrick Smith, a reporter for *The New York Times*, sued President Nixon, Henry Kissinger and others, including the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company ("C&P"), for tapping his telephone; the taps were part of an investigation by the White House "plumbers" of

suspected leaks. The D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of claims against the government officials but affirmed the dismissal of claims against C&P, which had installed the wiretap at the request of government officials acting without a warrant. The court rejected the Smiths' claims against C&P out of hand, adopting the district court's reasoning that the telephone company's "'limited technical role in the surveillance as well as its reasonable expectation of legality cannot give rise to liability for any statutory or constitutional violation.'" *Id.* at 1191 (quoting *Smith* v. *Nixon*, 449 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.D.C. 1978)); *see also id.* (noting that "the telephone company did not initiate the surveillance"). The reasoning derived from the district court's earlier decision in *Halperin* v. *Kissinger*, 424 F. Supp. 838, 846 (D.D.C. 1976), *rev'd on other grounds*, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), where the court rejected similar claims against a telephone company arising out of the same surveillance program. The court relied on the fact that the telephone company "played no part in selecting any wiretap suspects or in determining the length of time the surveillance should remain," and that it "overheard none of plaintiffs' conversations and was not informed of the nature or outcome of the investigation." *Id.*

This common-law immunity reflects the fact that carriers merely facilitate government-conducted surveillance (rather than engage in surveillance themselves) and would be reluctant to cooperate with the government if they could be sued for doing so. "[T]o deny the [sovereign] privilege to those who assist federal officers would conflict with the underlying policy of the privilege itself: to remove inhibitions against the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government." *Fowler* v. *Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 343 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1965) (recognizing defense to civil liability for telecommunications carrier); *see also Craska* v. *New York Tel. Co.*, 239 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D.N.Y. 1965) (recognizing defense based on "the common sense analysis that must be made of the undisputed minor part the defendant company played in this situation").

The FAC describes a classic situation for applying the immunity recognized in *Smith* and *Halperin*. The FAC alleges that AT&T merely had a limited, technical role in facilitating *the government's* surveillance pursuant to a program "the government had

instituted . . . ." FAC ¶ 3. The core allegation against AT&T is that it "opened its key telecommunications facilities and databases to direct access *by the NSA and/or other government agencies*, intercepting and disclosing *to the government* the contents of its customers' communications as well as detailed communications records." FAC ¶ 6 (emphasis added); *id.* ¶¶ 42-47 (alleging that AT&T has and is providing "the government" with access to transmitted communications through the use of interception devices such as pen registers); *id.* at ¶¶ 48-64; (alleging that AT&T has and is providing "the government" with access to databases containing stored communications records). This is exactly the sort of alleged activity that federal courts found non-actionable in *Smith* and *Halperin*: taking actions, at the government's direction, that merely allow government surveillance to be conducted through the carrier's facilities. The FAC does *not* allege that AT&T selected the targets of the government's surveillance, determined how long the surveillance would last, overheard conversations, or was told of the nature or outcome of the government's investigation. Accordingly, the FAC's allegations against AT&T, even assuming they were true, fall squarely within the immunity recognized by *Smith* and *Halperin*.

The FAC also demonstrates that, even assuming the actions alleged, AT&T would have had a "reasonable expectation" that they were authorized. It alleges that "[t]he President has stated that he authorized the Program in 2001, that he has reauthorized the Program more than 30 times since its inception, and that he intends to continue doing so." FAC ¶ 33. It alleges that "the government instigated, directed and/or tacitly approved all of the above-described acts of AT&T Corp." and that "AT&T Corp. had at all relevant times a primary or significant intent to assist or purpose of assisting the government in carrying out the Program and/or other government investigations." FAC ¶¶ 82, 84; *see also id.* ¶¶ 94, 95 (alleging that AT&T's actions were "under color of law"). The FAC thus alleges the type of cooperation that the common-law immunity is designed to protect and encourage.

3. The FAC establishes AT&T's qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Even if the plaintiffs had not failed to plead the required absence of the absolute immunity afforded by statute and common law, AT&T would, on the facts as alleged in the

FAC, be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.[9] Federal courts have recognized that qualified immunity is available in addition to statutory immunity under the ECPA. *See Tapley*, 211 F.3d at 1216 ("[t]he Federal Wiretap Act lacks the specific, unequivocal language necessary to abrogate the qualified immunity defense"); *Blake* v. *Wright*, 179 F.3d 1003, 1011-13 (6th Cir. 1999).[10] Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." *Harlo*w v. *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).

Qualified immunity also is available to private parties alleged to have assisted the government in performing traditional governmental functions. The availability of immunity for private parties is determined by analyzing two issues: (1) whether there is "a historical tradition of immunity for private parties carrying out" the functions at issue; and (2) "[w]hether the immunity doctrine's *purposes* warrant immunity" for the private parties. *Richardson v. McKnight*, 521 U.S. 399, 407, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997) (emphasis in original). These factors both confirm that qualified immunity is available to AT&T here.

First, federal courts have recognized a common-law immunity from suit that applies to telecommunications carriers that cooperate with government officials conducting warrantless surveillance. *See* page 13 above.

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[9] Qualified immunity can be established as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss. *E.g.*, *Rush* v. *FDIC*, 747 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The Supreme Court "repeatedly ha[s] stressed the importance of resolving [qualified] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." *Hunter* v. *Bryant*, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991).

[10] *But see Berry* v. *Funk*, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (qualified immunity not available for ECPA claims). The courts in *Tapley* and *Blake* declined to follow *Berry* because they correctly concluded that it made no sense to "infer that Congress meant to abolish in the Federal Wiretap Act that extra layer of protection qualified immunity provides for public officials simply because it included an extra statutory defense available to everyone." *Tapley*, 211 F.3d at 1216; *see also Blake*, 179 F.3d at 1012. In addition, the *Berry* court did not address the principle that qualified immunity can only be abolished by specific and unequivocal statutory language. *See Tapley*, 211 F.3d at 1216.

Second, the purposes of qualified immunity are served by affording AT&T immunity on the facts alleged here. Those purposes are: (1) to protect "government's ability to perform its traditional functions by providing immunity where necessary to preserve the ability of government officials to serve the public good"; (2) "to ensure that talented candidates [are] not deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service"; and (3) to protect "the public from unwarranted timidity on the part of public officials" by minimizing the threat of civil liability. *Richardson*, 521 U.S. at 408 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, even assuming AT&T engaged in the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs, all of these purposes strongly support qualified immunity for AT&T. Conducting surveillance to preserve national security is a traditional governmental function of the highest importance. In an electronic era, such surveillance may require the facilities of private companies that control critical telecommunications infrastructure. Yet carriers would be reluctant to furnish the required assistance if they were exposed to civil liability while the government officials actually ordering the surveillance were cloaked with qualified immunity. It would make little sense to protect the principal but not his agent.[11]

[11] *Richardson* presented the question whether prison guards employed by a private prison management firm could assert qualified immunity to a section 1983 suit brought by prisoners who alleged that the guards had injured them. The Supreme Court denied immunity, concluding that there is no tradition of immunity for private prison guards and that the private prison managers were "systematically organized" to assume a major governmental function, "for profit" and "in competition with other firms." *Richardson*, 521 U.S. at 405-07, 408-13. In marked contrast, AT&T is part of an industry traditionally immune from liability for assisting the government. Moreover, AT&T is not in the business of surveillance and does not aspire to perform traditional government functions such as espionage. Finally, unlike the private prison guards, AT&T is alleged to be "serving as an adjunct to government in an essential governmental activity" and "acting under close official supervision"—the precise context in which the Court suggested that qualified immunity may be available to private parties. *Id.* at 409, 413. AT&T's alleged situation is far closer to that of the citizen who helps law enforcement officials, a situation in which the federal courts have held that qualified immunity can be available to private parties. *See Mejia* v. *City of New York*, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citizen assisting in making an arrest); *Calloway* v. *Boro of Glassboro*, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 557 n.21 (D.N.J. 2000) (sign language interpreter during a police interrogation).

Where qualified immunity is available, a two-part analysis determines whether a defendant is entitled to it. The court must determine: (1) "whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a right that is clearly established"; and (2) "whether, under the facts alleged, a reasonable official could have believed that his conduct was lawful." *Collins* v. *Jordan*, 110 F.3d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under the first prong of the analysis, AT&T's alleged conduct does not violate any clearly established constitutional or statutory right. If the past several months' public debate, congressional debate, and legal argumentation over the Program demonstrates anything, it is that the legality of the Program is the subject of reasonable disagreement among well-intentioned and capable lawyers. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically reserved the question whether the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage in warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, *see United States v. United States District Court (Keith)*, 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321-22 & n.20 (1972), and the courts of appeals have unanimously held, even after the passage of FISA, that he does. *See, e.g., In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d at 742 (collecting cases). As such, even if AT&T's alleged conduct could be directly equated with that of the government – which it cannot – AT&T's alleged conduct could not amount to "a violation of a right that is clearly established." *Id.*

Second, nothing alleged in the FAC suggests that AT&T's alleged conduct was carried out in bad faith, *i.e.*, that it did not reasonably believe that any alleged conduct was lawful. The FAC alleges that the President authorized and reauthorized the government surveillance program, that "the government instigated, directed and/or tacitly approved" all of AT&T's alleged actions, and that AT&T "had at all relevant times a primary or significant intent to assist or purpose of assisting the government in carrying out the Program and/or other government investigations." *Id.* ¶¶ 33, 82, 84. These allegations demonstrate that, even if AT&T had done what the FAC alleges, it would have had a reasonable belief in the legality of its alleged conduct. Therefore, AT&T is entitled to qualified immunity from suit as a matter of law.

B. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING.

Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts have the power to adjudicate only actual "cases" and "controversies." "The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society," and "[t]he Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines." *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs must establish both constitutional and prudential standing. To establish constitutional standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate (among other things) that they suffered "an injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent." *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). In the context of a class action, the named plaintiffs "must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent." *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975); *see also O'Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (unless named plaintiffs have standing individually, "none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class"); *Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina*, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("Any injury unnamed members of this proposed class may have suffered is simply irrelevant . . . ."). To establish prudential standing, plaintiffs also must show that their situation differs from that of the public generally. *See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.*, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The standing inquiry must be "especially rigorous" where, as here, "reaching the merits of the dispute would force [a court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional." *Raines v. Byrd*, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).

1. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact.

The standing requirement "'focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.'" *Valley Forge Christian College*, 454 U.S. at 484 (quoting *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968)). Thus, the named plaintiffs' first task is to allege facts showing that *they* have suffered injury in fact. This they have failed to do.

In relation to both the Program and the related "data-mining" allegations, the FAC alleges in wholly conclusory terms that plaintiffs' communications have been or will be "disclosed" to the government, or that AT&T has provided some form of "access" to various databases or datastreams to the government. *See, e.g.*, FAC ¶ 52 ("On information and belief, AT&T Corp. has disclosed and is currently disclosing to the government records concerning communications to which Plaintiffs and class members were a party"); *id.* ¶ 61 ("On information and belief, AT&T Corp. has provided the government with direct access to the contents" of various databases that include generic categories information pertaining to plaintiffs); *see also id.* ¶¶ 6, 63, 64, 81, 97, 103, 105, 107, 113, 121, 128, 141. But the FAC alleges only that plaintiffs are (or were) AT&T customers who on occasion make international telephone calls or surf the Internet. FAC ¶¶ 13-16. No allegation suggests that plaintiffs ever communicated with terrorists or with al Qaeda—or gave the government reason to think they had. Indeed, the FAC expressly excludes from the class plaintiffs purport to represent "anyone who knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefore." *Id.* ¶ 70. Absent some concrete allegation that the government monitored their communications or records, all plaintiffs really have is a suggestion that AT&T provided a means by which the government *could have done so* had it wished. This is anything but injury-in-fact.[12]

[12] In their injunction papers, plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge that they cannot allege that any "human beings personally read or listen to the acquired communications" but claim it does not matter. Pl. Mem. in Support of Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 17. That is incorrect. None of the cases cited by plaintiffs is a standing case; all pertain only to the substantive (continued…)

To establish standing, a complaint's allegations must be *factual*. *See Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 561. Unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences will not suffice. Plaintiffs assert a belief that their communications have somehow been divulged to the government, but they allege no specific facts suggesting that government agents might have targeted them or their communications. The FAC is thus far weaker than other complaints filed by plaintiffs who, while failing to establish standing, at least could muster facts suggesting a governmental interest in their activities.

In *United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan*, 738 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984), for example, the plaintiffs included a number of stalwarts of the Vietnam antiwar movement and the civil rights movement, such as the former Stokeley Carmichael. *Id.* at 1381 n.2. They alleged that they had been or currently were subject to unlawful surveillance, frequently traveled abroad, and were particularly likely to be found to be agents of foreign powers. *Id.* at 1380. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Scalia, held that these activists could not establish standing to challenge Executive Order No. 12333, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," because they could not show they were subject to surveillance conducted under that Order. Similarly, in *Halkin v. Helms*, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the plaintiffs were antiwar activists who claimed that their communications had been intercepted. *Id.* at 981 n.3. Because they failed to provide factual support for this claim, however, the court held that they lacked standing to challenge government intelligence-gathering activities, including the CIA's "Operation CHAOS." The sole difference between the FAC and these complaints (beyond the fact that the plaintiffs there were noted activists) is that the plaintiffs here use the magic words "on

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(…continued)
scope of liability where plaintiffs' own communications had undoubtedly been monitored and standing was clear. In *Jacobson v. Rose*, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978), for example, the plaintiffs were individuals whose communications had actually been monitored by government agents; class action status was denied, and the district court limited the plaintiffs to those whose conversations had allegedly been overheard. *See id.* at 518. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit reversed a verdict against the phone company. Although the court said that "the victim's privacy is violated, regardless of which particular individuals actually listen to the tapes," *id.*, it never suggested that standing exists where there is no allegation that *anyone* has listened.

information and belief" to allege that AT&T has intercepted and disclosed their communications to the government. But that is legally insufficient.

Nor can plaintiffs establish standing through the common tactic of alleging that the Program (or AT&T's alleged involvement) has "chilled" constitutionally-protected activities. Although plaintiffs do not allege "chill" in the FAC, their preliminary injunction papers suggest that at least named-plaintiff Jewel asserts a "chill" on her speech. *See* Pl. Mem. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 25-26. This is precisely the kind of abstract injury that the federal courts have consistently held is insufficient to create standing to challenge a government surveillance program. In *Laird v. Tatum*, 408 U.S. 1, 13-15, 92 S. Ct. 2318 (1972), the plaintiffs were held not to have standing to challenge the Army's domestic surveillance of peaceful, civilian activity based on alleged "chill" because "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." *Id.* at 13-14. As the D.C. Circuit explained, "[a]ll of the Supreme Court cases employing the concept of 'chilling effect' involve situations in which the plaintiff has unquestionably suffered some concrete harm (past or immediately threatened) apart from the 'chill' itself. . . . 'Chilling effect' is cited as the *reason* why the governmental imposition is invalid rather than as the *harm* which entitles the plaintiff to challenge it." *United Presbyterian*, 738 F.2d at 1378 (citations omitted, emphasis original). In cases like this one that do not involve an "exercise of governmental power [that is] regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature," *Laird*, 408 U.S. at 11, "mere subjective chilling effects," such as those asserted by the plaintiffs, "are simply not objectively discernable and are therefore not constitutionally cognizable." *Vernon v. City of Los Angeles*, 27 F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also Donohoe v. Duling*, 465 F.2d 196, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1972).

2. Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with government policy does not give them standing.

The FAC is, at its core, founded on disagreement with the government's Terrorist Surveillance Program. Plaintiffs' interest in resolving this issue is no greater than that of any other citizen who disagrees with the government's conduct. In a democracy, this kind

of complaint is resolved by the political process, not the courts, especially not in a suit against a private third-party. "Vindicating the *public* interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 576 (emphasis in original). Courts should address such issues only as a last resort, and then only if an actual case or controversy is presented by a plaintiff who incurs an injury that differs from that incurred by dissatisfied citizens in general. *Valley Forge Christian College*, 454 U.S. at 473. "[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government – claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large – does not state an Article III case or controversy." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 574-75.

Plaintiffs may sincerely believe that the Program is illegal and unconstitutional, but that belief is not sufficient to create standing. Chief Justice Burger's observation in *Laird v. Tatum* is particularly appropriate here:

> Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is a broad-scale investigation, conducted by themselves as private parties armed with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of cross-examination, to probe into the Army's intelligence-gathering activities . . . Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.

Laird, 408 U.S. at 14-15.

The Supreme Court has voiced these concerns on a number of occasions. *See also, e.g.*, *Allen*, 468 U.S. at 750-61; *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983); *Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War*, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974); *O'Shea*, 414 U.S. 488, 492-95, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974). Article III courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, not vehicles for publicizing political conflicts or roving commissions to enable more discovery or public disclosure of sensitive or classified government programs than the Freedom of Information Act allows.

These concerns are at their apex when a plaintiff seeks to probe the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. As this Court said in *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced*

Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2001), "[t]he Supreme Court has long acknowledged the federal government's broad authority over foreign affairs" and "observed that the Constitution entrusts 'the field of foreign affairs . . . to the President and the Congress.'" (citations omitted).

For good reason, courts are loath to interfere with issues firmly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Public accounts of the Terrorist Surveillance Program indicate that the executive branch uses it to gather foreign intelligence and time-sensitive counterterrorism information and that it was approved by the government's most senior legal officials. Indeed, Congress is now reviewing this understanding. *See, e.g.*, Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2455, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced March 16, 2006). Few issues are less suited to judicial resolution than an ongoing national policy dispute concerning the propriety of foreign intelligence activities.

3. Plaintiffs fail to allege concrete injuries to their statutory interests.

To have standing, a plaintiff must allege a concrete and personal stake in the outcome of a lawsuit. The constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact is no less applicable when violation of a statute is alleged. *O'Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. at 493-94 (citing *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962); *United States v. SCRAP*, 412 U.S. 669, 687, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (1973)). "[S]tatutes do not purport to bestow the right to sue in the absence of any indication that invasion of the statutory right has occurred or is likely to occur." *O'Shea*, 414 U.S. at 495 n.2.

Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their statutory claims (Counts II-VII) because the FAC alleges no *facts* suggesting that their statutory rights have been violated. For example, Count II asserts a claim under the criminal and civil liability provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809, 1810. Plaintiffs allege "on information and belief" that AT&T has installed or helped to install "interception devices and pen registers and/or trap and trace devices" and conclude that AT&T has conducted "electronic surveillance" (as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801). FAC ¶¶ 43, 93-94. But even if true, these allegations are insufficient to establish that plaintiffs themselves suffered any

definite injury sufficient to entitle them to represent the class of individuals whose communications they allege to have been intercepted. Plaintiffs' own allegations do not make the facially absurd claim that *all* AT&T customers have been subjected to surveillance by the government,[13] and the FAC alleges nothing to suggest that the *named plaintiffs* were themselves subject to surveillance. Because the named plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating that, under the applicable FISA definitions, the government actually acquired the content of their own communications, [14] they are without standing. The other counts of the FAC fare no better.[15]

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

Dated: April 28, 2006.

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[13] For example, plaintiffs allege that interception devices "acquire the content of all *or a substantial number of* the wire or electronic communications transferred through the AT&T Corp. facilities *where they have been installed*" (emphasis added). FAC ¶ 44. Similar allegations appear in ¶ 45 with respect to the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. Thus, plaintiffs appear to allege that some AT&T customers were not subject to the surveillance alleged in the FAC: not all, but only a "substantial number" of communications transferred by AT&T Corp. may have been subject to surveillance, and only communications passing through certain facilities are even alleged to have been subject to surveillance. Moreover, there is no allegation regarding whether or how the government actually reviews or uses the data, if at all.

[14] Nor could they, as the facts necessary to support such an allegation would, even if they existed, be classified and legally unavailable to any private party, including AT&T.

[15] Counts III, IV, V and VI parrot the relevant statutory language, but no facts buttress the legal conclusions that plaintiffs recite, and no actual injury is alleged. Plaintiffs' allegation of unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 has the further standing flaw that plaintiffs failed to allege facts indicating that they "suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17204. Indeed, there is no suggestion that they did not receive the telecommunications services for which they paid.

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